The Gist of the Great Reset

gist (law) – the real point of an action

“We can not absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places, and by different workmen … and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house … in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe … all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first lick was struck.” -Abraham Lincoln, the “House Divided Speech”

Suppose you are negotiating with a person. You know, and they are likely to know as well, that the more advantaged one’s position, the better a deal they can make for themselves. If they are one person among many with whom you can negotiate, they will be forced to negotiate by seeking a price lower than others. If, on the other hand, there is nowhere else for you to go, and they know this, they can very well seek a handsome compensation. Other factors can play into determining the equilibrium. If you have a lot of time to search, that gives you an advantage. If you have little time to search, that gives them an advantage. And so on. In general, to get the best deal for oneself, you want all the advantage possible.

The elite, comprising the very few of the population of a society, perhaps one in several hundred thousand individuals, have enormous wealth and power, but it is not infinite. They have a key advantage over the masses, in that they are fewer and therefore it is easier to coordinate among themselves than for the masses to coordinate, which goes a great length in explaining why we cannot just overwhelm them by our numbers. To coordinate our numbers we depend on them, and if one or a few elite sought to use their power of coordinating the mass to defect against their fellow elite, then the rest of the elite would quickly coordinate their masses against the few defecting elites. Anyone who could coordinate the mass is, practically by definition, an elite. Most members of the elite, in fact, while their share of power and wealth is great when compared to that of an average member of the mass, only have little power and wealth in relation to a few among the elite, the true elite-of-the-elite, kingmakers, who have the power to elevate those of their choosing to the elite, or to destroy nearly any other elite, save those few other elite-of-the-elite. Let us call these hyper-elite for short.

Elites organize the masses through the use of formal, or institutional, tools. These include things like laws, policies, media messaging, and education. These are used to regulate and control the behavior of the masses, to incentivize certain behaviors (by attaching rewards to them) or disincentive certain behaviors (by attaching punishments to them). These tools are clumsy and vulgar, in the sense that they are required to be leveraged on the scale of millions of people, in order to derive outcomes that are more meaningful in a statistical sense. The overwhelming majority of the masses’ interactions with elites are through these channels, and an individual of the mass having their behavior controlled by the elite in some other way is the exception. That is not to say these exceptions aren’t without meaning, and we will attend to them. But in general, elites use their available tools to effect statistical influences – they are not trying to control you individually, but to organize the mass, and you along with it. This is because each individual depends on others, which relates them to the mass, and therefore makes individuals in the masses regulated more by the masses around them in their day-to-day behavior, within the confines of these tools used by elites.

Elites organize among themselves, and especially are organized by the hyper-elites, informally. That is not to say they don’t respond to the tools of mass control, but they tend to have more control over those tools and so their behavior is incentivized less by subordination to such tools and more by mastery of those tools. Elites can use these tools to attempt controlling each other, but this needs to be done in a way that accounts for the targeted elite’s relative control over these same tools. For example, if one elite ran a media campaign against another, the other might respond by directing more legal scrutiny against the former. Thus, even when they use formal tools, the conditions and circumstances by which they navigate the use of these formal tools is still informal. If one is familiar with “office politics,” that is an appropriately similar model. Personality and informal understandings are more often what effects organization between elites.

Elites and the masses negotiate between each other, effectively as competing parties. The elite are seeking to improve and maintain their current levels of wealth and power, in order to compete with one another. The masses are seeking to improve and maintain their current living standards (although that is not to say games of power and wealth can be played between them on a smaller scale). The better off the masses in general the better their position for negotiating with the elites and holding out for a better deal. This can look like them preferring to elevate politicians to power who make realistic promises to change policy to benefit them, e.g. by reducing their taxes, increasing their public benefits, building better infrastructure, and so on. The worse off the masses in general, the worse their position for negotiating. They will be more apt under worse conditions to take what deals are necessary to stay fed and keep the lights on.

Now, a seeming tangent. In order to succeed as an elite, one usually must work with others. One must use not only the official capacities of their office, but must employ the discretion of their office to benefit each other mutually. Knowing people who can do you favors is a way to improve your position when negotiating with someone else, so that you come out the better in your interactions. Not all negotiations between people are zero or negative sum game – in fact, many are positive sum, but that doesn’t mean gaining an advantage won’t allow one to take the better part of the benefit for oneself. In fact, one must, in the sense that if one does not, then others who do, will outcompete them for resources, promotions, and the like. Thus it improves one’s power to have friends who are powerful as well.

But the problem is that people in power, have power. Someone with the power to elevate you probably also has the power to destroy you. And the more one acquires power, the more opportunities for power one will have, and thus the more incentive there is to defect on friends. Once a friend has elevated you to power, they might no longer be useful to you. In fact, they might be a hindrance, if your association or need to do them favors in turn leaves you vulnerable to others in power. Thus, there tend to form gangs in power. Gangs in Washington, D.C. are just like street gangs, the difference being nothing in quality, only the quantity of power and wealth.

The members of gangs are not necessarily all like-minded individuals. In fact, it benefits a gang if their members are in very many different positions, so that they can benefit each other in many different places. It helps to have journalists who will promote you in media and help you do damage control when necessary, it helps to have doctors who will diagnose enemies with mental disorders so they cannot credibly oppose you, it helps to have bureaucrats who will impede your opposition’s political success from becoming a foundation for lasting power, it helps to have law enforcement who will cover up your crimes and pin crimes on enemies. But how can one make sure that these individuals will cooperate with you, over long periods of time when there are strong incentives to defect against one another?

A powerful tool is blackmail. If you have evidence of someone committing a crime, you can keep it to yourself as long as they cooperate, and if they defect, you can simply divulge that evidence. When great wealth and power is at stake, the more people will be willing to use such a powerful tool. Blackmail can be used not only to maintain alliances, but to maintain control over assets that one elevates to powerful positions in order to expand one’s power. What happens is someone does not find someone good at something, and then try to tempt them with the illicit – they find people who have already fallen for the temptation, then bring them in. The scheme might never be made explicit, and the blackmailer might never let on who else or how many he is blackmailing, but when one begins such a scheme, it is likely to accumulate. This is because those using such powerful tools gain more access to power, and in turn use their power to exploit more through blackmail, and so on.

The details of such a scheme do not need to be laid out, and I will not do so here. It is enough to point out that such schemes are likely to expand and wane in their use by power, and that it forms a veritable “dark matter” of power behind the scenes which would explain a great deal of the visible phenomena we know. If people are cooperating who you do not expect to cooperate – or who might cooperate only under conditions of blackmail – then because this is invisible, and largely unknown, people are left to speculate on appearances under false assumptions. If one hypothesizes these schemes of blackmail, then a lot about power becomes clear. The saving grace of these schemes is they tend to self-destruct, or else dissipate in their utility through over-use. We might say they represent an accumulation of entropy in our social systems.

Most caught up in these schemes might never think about how these schemes might eventually end, but, and this is obvious when one considers it, the most powerful players are necessarily those aware of such schemes and their utility, even if they do not personally use them. An example of blackmail material that dissipated in utility is homosexuality. During the mid-20th century, many were elevated by those above them because they were homosexuals who could be easily controlled through blackmail. Eventually, those who initially elevated them retired or died off, and many of these homosexuals attained more power. However, because no one likes being blackmailed, many of them used their influence to normalize homosexuality, such that we observed homosexuality rapidly become accepted in only the last several decades. This left a gap that was rapidly filled, replaced by pedophilia in the place of homosexuality as an easy way to control someone.

By now you’ve heard of Jeffrey Epstein, so the premise of a pedophile blackmail network is not unfamiliar. Many specifics are ambiguous, but we can be reasonably sure the blackmail involved the capturing of video and photographic recordings. The use of photography to have irrefutable evidence of someone’s wrongdoing in order to blackmail that person is an old one. What is new is technology that makes “deepfakes” possible. This is how the house of cards implodes. Within only a few years “That isn’t me, it was a deepfake created to harm my reputation” will become a valid defense. The more powerful the person in question, the more incentive to create such deepfakes in an attempt to harm them. This means the power of the schemes is lost. The ties that bind people are loosed.

The geopolitical consequences are enormous and probably catastrophic. Coalitions that used to be tightknit are now becoming undone, and with that the organization of power rapidly divests itself from these blackmail network schemes. Coalitions within governments but also coalitions across governments deteriorate. It is hard to overstate the seriousness of what is going on behind the scenes. Blackmail networks, as odious they are, offered a degree of predictability and coordination not otherwise possible without them. If the blackmail no longer keeps people in check, then uncertainty increases. People who are in power now that rose to such heights by being groomed or making mutual blackmail to forge alliances can no longer be as certain they were before their friends will not turn on them. If they are less certain, they might themselves choose to pre-empt any defection against them by defecting first. Even if they do not want to, they must certainly consider the possibility of their former friends turning on them pre-emptively as well. What used to be held tightly in place, now shifts easily. This makes it altogether certain that within the next decade, these informal alliances and organizations in control of many of the most powerful positions in institutions around the world will deteriorate. Someone will strike first, and everyone in the know will recognize that it signals the beginning of the end.

These are not unpredictable consequences, however. It is possible to see, from decades ago, how these schemes would turn out. This means that some players have certainly been organizing and investing themselves so as to benefit from how things will change.

Hence the Great Reset. What is being discussed is not only “resetting” the social contract between government and the masses, but the resetting of the organization of power itself. Those few players who have placed themselves in positions necessary to take advantage of these changes will very suddenly have a great deal of power while many players will find themselves rapidly losing power. These few players will be able to pick and choose from the many players who to bring into their new organization of power, and with that, their advantage in negotiation will indubitably require the many to compete among each other to provide those few players as much power and wealth as they can. In order for the many to gain an advantage of favor with the few, they will pillage their own people.

This is why government policies of late have the salient character of impoverishing and indebting the masses. There has been no reform re: student loans because that makes people easier to control. There has been no broad education reform because the worse off people are, the better a deal elites can make in their own favor when it comes to gaining the favor of the new, few power players. So on and so forth, when one consider the past decade or two of legislation and the politicking going into it, one gets the sense politicians are trying to run out the clock, allowing their constituents as few points in their favor as possible so that, when the inevitable crisis comes – and it will come – they are able to get the best deal for themselves. When people are hungry, afraid, and uncertain, they are more likely to take the first deal they can get. The stagnation of government is intentional. The failure to solve obvious problems that have been allowed to openly fester is purposeful, and serves those in power, because it becomes an “easy fix” they can solve instead of having to solve other significant problems. It is like starving a child because, if they were fed as they should, gaining their obedience under discipline would be harder to “buy” and would require the parent to provide other favors that are costly to them, like dessert, or a new video game, or a sleepover with their friends. Politicians are withholding as much as they can now, because if they relented and provide to their constituents what they should it would cost them more to buy their favor.

That is the gist of the Great Reset. It is not a grand conspiracy. It is a matter of politicians responding to their immediate incentives in order to survive the coming storm. And the people are sure to suffer for it.

The Essence of Neoreaction – A Final Epitaph

“When several of these Pokémon gather, their electricity could build and cause lightning storms.” -Pokémon Red/Blue description for Pikachu

There is a time for looking ahead, and a time for looking back. Lately I have been preoccupied with looking ahead, concerned principally – at least for my own life – with putting together a suite of skills in programming in order to realize certain ideas and find employment. Haven’t we all? What else is there to do during the never-ending lockdowns? But, at least at the moment, it might profit us to look back, to consider what was, to speak on our youth from the perspective of (hopefully!) a little more hard-earned wisdom and experience, and perhaps to reminisce a little, as a treat. So, how about that neoreaction business?

These years on I can say I have finally come around to what is, at least, my own private understanding about what constituted the core meaning of our slapdash enterprise. We were young, foolish, inexperienced, and just absolutely burning up with indomitable energy and intelligence. We were the prototypical, paradigmatic form of weaponized autism. Autism aside, so do many young people at that age – most of us were in our very early 20’s – engage in frightfully foolish and even cringeworthy experiences. That can hardly be avoided. Who hasn’t said an unconsidered thing to a girl at a party? Who hasn’t thought they were capable of drinking more than they could, only to find themselves waking up on their friend’s couch in the middle of the night suddenly, throwing up, with no other recollection what else happened since they bought that one last pitcher of beer at the bar? So it is difficult to dissimulate that exceptional and brash culture from the folly of youth.

Now? The party is long over. Why are you still dancing? The DJ stopped playing hours ago. Go home. Try not to step in the throwup there in the corner on your way out.

Neoreaction is dead. Anyone still trying to go by that label has missed the memo. No one’s working in that space anymore, and anyone trying to operate under that name does so with the same spirit as someone living out their dreams of completing the system of German idealism in Europa Universalis IV. I can’t blame people for trying to keep it going. It was a lot of fun. It was definitely interesting. And moreover, it was cool. As it turns out, if you sufficiently concentrate autism, it becomes real fuckin’ neato. Or something. Maybe we’re delusional. Just let people enjoy things. But it’s not cool anymore, and not just because I left.

Now that the fire’s completely burnt down and cooled, we can gather up a couple cold coals and look at them closely, to recognize what, if anything, neoreaction actually created anything in its incendiary conflagration. Oh yes, it was certainly incendiary – the rule pervaded that nothing was off-limits. Certainly there was evoked old demons of yore as a matter of dispassionate experimentation, just to see. I don’t think the average neoreactionary now would consider themselves to hold many of those positions in their pure or aggressive forms as they were hypothesized then. Certainly when I skim over the old texts (my old AnarchoPapist blogposts, a fair few I have saved), I find myself as often cringing as agreeing. Moments of erudition tangled up with a morass of, how to put it bluntly? Folly. Youthful folly. I imagine if the ghost of Christmas past brought us to see ourselves at college parties struggling to converse with the opposite sex we would feel the same.

Would I take any of it back? Well, no, that would be impossible. There was, obviously, a blind groping in my work. A blind groping in all our work. A certainty that the current arrangement of opinion did not have the solution for our society’s ills, for if it did, then such ills would not be, now would they? Thus, a certainty of the need to search outside the straitjacket of popular opinion. And of course a person breaking out of a straitjacket looks crazy, no matter the conditions in which he was put in it. There was a need to become conversant with heresies and unorthodoxies and crackpottery and lunacy. Out of all that material, a sparse but valuable substance would come. Now that the experiment has been convened, we can confidently draw conclusions we would not be able to draw otherwise.

That provocative essence, if I might be so bold as to determine it, is that the social sciences must be de-anthropocentrised. We must evaluate human nature from the perspective that, in fact, the cosmic order does not revolve around we humans. We live in and are formed by nature to its purposes, rather than nature existing for ours. This is it. That is the essence. All the rest follows.

Whatever else one might have taken neoreaction to be about is, at best, a symptom, an epiphenomena, something downstream of this insight. Oh I know this won’t dispel the image that many will have built up in their minds, something convenient to their politics, something which can be used to try and threaten someone into line. I am familiar with human nature. It is a winning strategy to demonize. Isn’t this what everyone agrees on? That whites were successful at traversing the globe and making sure no one else could (except for the Muslims and Chinese and Indians and not to mention the many peoples who came before all them) because they demonized the other races? I thought Hitler was successful because he demonized an unpopular group of people. Certainly no one else would do that, just in order to gain power, all the while believing themselves true and good and just, would they? Of course not. That would never happen again, demonizing one’s opponents, because surely people learned from history this time. Finally! A miracle mankind has desired for millennia. If neoreactionaries are accused of racism, it must be because they are! No one would ever use an overly broad and malicious interpretation just to dissuade others from considering things that might be inconvenient for them, politically speaking.

Sure there are vulgarities, ill-considered statements, all kinds of meanness in abundance. Such as it is everywhere. I’m familiar with those in the movement with opinions I consider repugnant. I could just as well bring up any example of antifa/BLM rioters burning down a small business that cannot be simply rebuilt. My poor Hugo’s. There were thousands of golden age science fiction novels that burned with the building. I know there must have been some very rare first editions signed by authors as well. This is one of the nicer examples I can bring up. I hardly need to bring up the threats, the assaults, the vast destruction, the murders. There are individuals of unscrupulous character on “my side,” there are unscrupulous characters on “your side,” and quite frankly it is delusion to presume that somehow holding in mind the correct opinions works as some sort of charm to ward off evil and malignant behavior. Now that is delusional superstition! I could go on, the self-described “feminist” men who prey on women, the actually unironic supporters of white genocide, the women who deceive men into raising children that are not theirs or who use the legal system to harm men with lies and sheer cruelty.

So of course, being aware of such examples, I know there is excess, mean-spiritedness, selfishness, greed, cruelty. After all, I have pointed out that we must study human nature from a perspective that negates anthropocentrism. Do you want me to denounce the entire human race? Well, perhaps I would, if you allow me to separate the autists from the rest of you and we can form our own happy utopia. Oh, did you think I was going to say “white people?” Don’t be foolish. There are brilliant autistic minds of all colors, black, Asian, white, Jewish, and so on. I don’t discriminate against any race. But I certainly do discriminate against neurotypicals – since I’m sure you do, deep down, hope I hold some kind of horribly discriminatory sentiment! That makes your case against me and neoreaction easier. Happy now? You can quote me on that, dear intrepid New York Times reporter looking for a convenient miscontextualized slander to use in their next hatchet case against Scott Alexander.

I have sought to form and act by my morals as I understand them all the while. I’m sure I have matured. I have learned to appreciate the diversity of human nature, even its darker elements, as an expression of a fundamental seeking for love. But I’m sure no one here cares too much for my very personal beliefs on such matters.

I really have nothing else to add. Neoreaction was fun. I made friends. I regret what came between us in the end. I enjoy the friends I still have, and the new friends I have made. I am older now. I’ve already moved on. The idea of reanimating the corpse of neoreaction is not pleasant for me. I have better, bigger plans now, and neoreaction isn’t a part of them. Please, if you think to describe yourself by such a term as NRx, I hope it is purely out of ironic jest, but I still won’t pretend it’s a good joke nonetheless. I don’t even make my old book “What Is Neoreaction?” available. I’m sure you can track it down, but it’s better if you don’t – it is amateurish, poorly edited, and egotistical. I only wrote it to solidify my clout within the movement and to assert my leadership, as obscured I might have otherwise sought to make it for outsiders. I was the de facto leader of neoreaction. I am declaring it dead. I get it, everyone enjoys giving a dead horse a good kick, just for that sick visceral thrill. But I’m just not the “AnarchoPapist” anymore. I am neither any longer a Catholic or an anarchist.

That is not to say the animating spirit of neoreaction isn’t still alive. It is still there – it just isn’t in neoreaction.

The Reasons for Present Circumstances

“I am not one of those who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been so, frequently and outrageously, both in other countries and in this. But I do say, that in all disputes between them and their rulers, the presumption is at least upon a par in favor of the people. […] Where popular discontents have been very prevalent; it may well be affirmed and supported, that there has been generally something found amiss in the constitution, or in the conduct of Government.”

-Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770)

There abound errors upon compounded errors in the popular considerations on why people are unhappy and live in fear, unable to trust their neighbors, divided, uncertain what tomorrow politics will bring. Left and right, if we suppose these as a crude generalization of the two bodies composing the greater social whole of the classes beneath the elite, have probably never been so divided in this country since the destructive – even if noble – Civil War. However, we also need to immediately draw out the presence and machinations of the third party, the elite, who cannot be reasonably associated with either party, even while they operate through them for their own purposes. It would be as much a mistake to identify the Church with the Nobility in a kingdom, an equivocation that ultimately only serves those in power as their true identities, purposes, and means remain undiscovered, even while some elements of reality are mixed in with that assessment. Here we shall lay out a few theses to help bring clarity to present circumstances.

The first element which must be described are the natural divisions of the people – who are here defined as that group who are brought together by the government as a population of citizens ruled together by the government. These are everyone who is not elite. The elites, in turn, are effectively those who preside over the government, either directly or indirectly by their possession of great wealth and power, managing the country in alignment with their personal pursuits and ambitions, which is ultimately to form and maintain their intergenerational wealth. While they may constrain each other by the same laws as the people exist under, and certainly they seek to mitigate all excesses of power as murder and theft – between themselves at least – for the most part the government and its laws are a means by which they rule rather than something they are ruled by. This is an inevitable state of affairs – laws are ultimately agreements between humans to enforce a common set of rules, to define who is in the right and who is in the wrong in case of transgressions, so that equilibrium between people prevails so far as possible and conflicts are resolved and ameliorated with the least amount of violence and uncertainty. This is the role elites find themselves in, and whether one considers it by natural law or pure happenstance, so we must require them to abide by this necessary role of civilization, to regulate relations between people in order that a common prosperity prevails for all.

This natural and inevitable division between the elite and the people is vertical. The elite are those who operate from “above” the law, as it were, not that they are not constrained by it so much as they are personally responsible for seeing that it is maintained. They are expected to temper those excesses between themselves and the politicians directly responsible for enforcing and defining those laws, much as parents are expected to regulate and civilize their children. If they neglect this role, then all is quickly chaos, and their future holdings of wealth and power uncertain, so in fact it is in their self-interest to enforce the law between themselves and for the sake of the people. Some may defect against this role in reckless pursuit of greater wealth and power for themselves, but the majority generally seek to temper these excesses. The elite overall have the most discretion, the most influence to define and see to it that laws are enforced for the common good, and so we have elaborated on them in order to draw them out as a distinct faction in our society, as influential in their few numbers as the better part of the hundreds of millions they rule over.

The people, in their great numbers and generally in possession of the greater amount of power and wealth among them (the numbers by which we define elite wealth such as “net worth” more dependent on the good organization of the people than in turn), are however unable to bring that power and wealth to bear as directly as may the elite. The elite are few and, at least individually, often superior in coordinating between each other. The people are numerous and it is much easier for them to feel individually that other natural divisions of interests are more immediate and effective in influencing their day to day life and expectations of the future. These natural divisions – which I assert as natural as their basis for divergent interests is due to inevitable differences in how humans sort themselves, for better or worse – gain much more of the people’s attention because they are more obvious and, typically, more immediately and apparently responsive to their own rhetorical clamorings in politics. I draw out these divisions as a positive, rather than normative, manner, as some by their ideologies seem intent on admitting only those divisions useful to their analysis and attempting to abolish by words the reality of these other divisions as inconvenient to how they imagine they might operate in pursuit of personal and collective ambitions, e.g. Marxism or contemporary racial ideologies such as “anti-racism” or “white nationalism.”

These divisions, which are an incomplete list, may generally be defined by their differing interests, which orients them to the government and politics differently in how their own personal ambitions and pursuits for happiness might be optimized. While they might otherwise have most things in common – as we are all human, and need for sustenance the same things as food, shelter, to gain by our work, to care for our families, to form friendships, to attain healthcare as necessary, and so on – the means by which the people go about these things and exercise their stake in civilization afford some advantages to certain kinds of policies over others. This is largely what defines politics, and what politicians seek to appeal to in gathering together those voting constituents necessary to gain the votes they require to hold their position. An individual will likely belong to several, and certainly all individuals a part of these groups does not hold all the same interests or beliefs as all other individuals in their group, but there is a distribution with a median set of interests typically held in common among them, even if only in the loosest and most general sense.

These groups may be defined by class, race, gender, and citizenship. Thus we have the upper classes – typically wealthier than the rest, but dependent on continuing labor to sustain their income. The middle classes often have careers that provide them a good income so that they do not want for most material things. Then there is the lower classes, who are the most heterogeneous, and are as a rule poor. The lower classes are most abundant as a rule, and typically they are consolidated as a political force by politicians who seek to reinforce those aspects of their life they feel are most immediately required to maintain their safety in an otherwise precarious world. Some of these lower classes have a more immediate interest in purely material benefits, others might feel that less tangible but equally immediate social benefits are in their interest to improve and reinforce by political means. Either way, the upper classes and middle classes, at least with respect to members of their own class, have a more homogeneous and coordinated vector of interests around which they tend to pursue their interests in common, while the lower classes are most likely to resent each other and be fearful of the others’ gain by some kind of political conquest resulting in some kind of dispossession, whether that is material or social. As a rule, middle and upper classes prefer to resolve their political disputes by compromise, while lower classes are more likely to believe and pursue zero or even negative sum games of power, as little their possession of it might seem, because such little possession makes them feel the sting of what little they have being deprived more acutely.

The races do not need much elaboration, but we might draw out certain ideas about races that are popular. Some suppose that race is all-important, and indeed, in the popular media, racial conflict is almost always the angle that brings the most energies attending to it. Racial differences seem the most apparent and, even if humans belonging to different races might otherwise have more in common as a class when it comes to their interests, especially in the lower classes they are often the most acute difference when one considers that, say, poor whites and poor blacks are otherwise very similar in what they require of government. Some will argue that “race” as a subject is entirely made up, and while they might be right that race as such is wielded as an instrument of power to divide, it is faulty to paper over the differences in such a manner – and often the racial ideology of “social constructivism” is employed by academics and journalists secure in their status as precisely that instrument of power to divide! The differences are real and have some innate basis – although obviously neither is this to suggest it is the one and only determining basis of an individual’s character and interests. Rather, the differences manifest them as slight differences in the distribution of interests of their members and, at least as a matter of personal optimism, their differences cannot only be overcome but make them a more versatile force – if they could be brought together under a banner that allows them to concentrate their considerable power to obtain certain material and social benefits they require in common. But, alas, these differences seem to be a division which politics (remember that elites are above our politics!) draw out in order to more easily corral their voting pattern in the interests of politicians even if that is against their common interests as a whole. Voters are, as a rule, more swayed by what is immediate and apparent, than the more abstract idea of class.

Gender, at least as we shall handle it here, is only that divide between men and women. This division shall be considered in terms of reproduction, as that is the natural and ineluctable reason for their differences. Other “genders,” as considered by those under the sway of metaphysical ideas beyond the scope of this essay to address, shall be attended to as a “non-reproductive class,” the reasons for their being grouped together made apparent then. As to men and women, what divides them and what brings them together are their particular interests as they are oriented towards reproduction by nature. Here I will not abide so much confusion as predominates contemporary discussion concerning them, but I will cut to it straight out of a scientific, perhaps anthropological, interest. Nature has found utility in causing men and women to be particular in how they are constituted and their preferences as it serves their own advantages in reproduction, per evolutionary necessity. This difference might be stated as thus: men have it in their interest to reproduce with abandon, women have it in their interest to reproduce with care. It is less costly for a man to conceive a child than a woman, as the burden of childcare will far more likely fall on the woman. Many social norms and customs have sprung up around these differences in reproductive interests, to ameliorate behaviors that, if pursued by the sexes without respect to their mutual interests, would be destructive to the pursuit of civilization. In fact, the norms surrounding our interest in reproduction and the care of children is one of the most important factors distinguishing our societies from the rest of the animal kingdom, and they more or less define civilization. In the long run, we require men and women to reproduce in a manner benefiting the civilization of children, so that they carry forward the matter of our societies into the future.

Politics has played men and women against each other, much to our respective detriment, as it has made it more difficult for men and women to understand each other, at least in terms of what customs and manners men and women follow respecting the differences of their sex. The distribution of differences between women and men, when measured along numerous divisions, have a fair degree of overlap but it would be inadmissible as a matter of scientific interest to ignore that, in the end, men and women demonstrate very distinct patterns in constitution and preference. An individual who might be an outlier along one dimension are rarely outliers along every other dimension, so that even when some trait demonstrates itself in an individual to distinguish themselves from others of their sex and to seem more similar to the other, only such an exceptional few are in fact outliers along each quality so as to definitively blur the line where differences matter to us. How one admits – or denies – these facts, and what one makes of them are a matter to politics insofar as politicians can appeal to men and women respectively for votes. In the United States at least, men are more likely to vote Republican, women more likely to vote Democrat, but this is really a slight difference overall. A more distinguishing pattern which illuminates the matter of sexual differences, is that unmarried men and women are more likely to vote Democrat, and married men and women more likely to vote Republican. So, in fact, what resolves differences in how the sexes tend to vote and thereby express their interests depends more on their individual immediate relationship with some member of the opposite sex. This makes a lot of sense when one considers their interests per reproduction, which marriage has emerged as a social custom to normalize those relations.

The last natural divisions are more inchoate and more difficult to define generally, though they make their presence felt more particularly here and there where they are a substantial group. There are immigrants, who are either trying to or only recently have acquired citizenship, and are usually intent on assimilating themselves into American culture in order to make a life for themselves and their children. Of course there are further divisions of immigrants, which often makes them opposed to each other in terms of interests, not only racially but what conditions arose as to bring them here. The Hispanic groups seeking to escape crime and tyranny and poverty in their countries are quite distinct from the wealthy Chinese seeking to secure their capital profits from China here in the United States where they will not be so arbitrarily dispossessed by the CCP. We can say little about immigrants for our analysis here, except to note that their interests are often particular and suited to their own particular conditions and groups with which they arrive and who help them to establish themselves here in our country. They are otherwise further distinct from native citizens who, though they are descended from immigrants several or more generations back, are Americans in mind and spirit insofar as they have only been exposed to American culture as a basis for forming their worldviews. There are also indigenous people, but as a political force they are little felt, and practically speaking they are often grouped with these minority groups, ironically closer to immigrants than natives.

The final group for our consideration are an even more variegated group of highly particularized individuals, whom we can group together as non-reproductive in outlook even if a few of this group otherwise do care to have children. These are gays, lesbians, trans, and whatever else some individual might consider themselves, as it is usually centered on sexuality, in particular a divergence from reproduction, non-reproductive is how they shall be considered. The reason for this is simple: since they are non-reproductive, their interests are centered entirely around themselves, with little reason to care or consider the future of civilization beyond their own lives. This is not said to denigrate or devalue them as persons, only to point out that they tend, than all the other groups brought up so far, to have far less tangible stakes in the future of society beyond their persons, e.g. children. A person who has children is far more likely to feel innately the need to re-orient their interests beyond themselves, to care for the future of a society which they will not personally benefit from, so that it will benefit their children instead. These non-reproductive individuals do not have that as a matter to influence how they feel in the present, and so they tend to look out particularly for their own present interests and do not feel the sting of worrying about the future of a society they will not be around to experience. Since they are otherwise distinct in their interests between each other, there is not much more for our analysis to say about them.

Now, having laid out all the foregoing natural divisions of the people, we may finally attend to that matter of politics to understand what motivates present phenomena where it concerns popular narratives and seemingly likely changes in government that are about to affect us all very soon. All of these groups of the people, when it comes to how they organize themselves in order to influence politics in favor of their interests, have a limited number of means for doing so, because when trying to coordinate so many people with differing interests to consolidate and direct specific kinds of policies they are required to conjoin by rhetoric and phenomenal flourishes in media those stimuli that produce the final effect of making them vote for specific politicians and putting pressure on politicians as a whole to deliver legislation. Thus we have, in the end, “two or three” groups. This final outline is indeterminate, in that it seems there is no final way to eliminate two of these three, even if those two in fact are really ultimately under the rule of one and so have that status in common with each other. These are the elite, the left, and the right. The elite are, as described earlier, above politics, instead effecting their rule through the mechanisms of government and politics to maintain their status. The left and right are apposite wings of the people, who end up divided out of a political necessity to maintain the largest possible effective constituency as woven together from the many groups who live with each other in our country. Thus we have two groups of the people, who appear split not only by numbers of their population but in political power, effectively 50-50.

If the people had some way to unite to become one, they would overwhelm the elite. This would be bad for them. It would likely result in some degree of instability (all ventures and changes bring with them risk), but it would not be intolerable or unmanageable. But it would be bad for the elites, as far as their interests are concerned. Their hold on the institutions of society would be considerably loosened, the government would reorganize itself to satisfy the interests of the more powerful group, and very likely many of the most popular policies could be realized, such as universal healthcare, education reform, criminal and prison reform, and so on. Perhaps mixed in would be several disastrous policies, and probably these reforms would be sub-optimal, but they would still probably be better than current arrangements – so far as the interests of the people are concerned, and to the detriment of the elite. There would still be an elite, but they would be weakened considerably, and it would determine a reorganization of geopolitical alliances. But this is almost certainly never going to happen, as the necessities of game theory on the individual and group level for the people determine them to be in more immediate conflict with each other almost as it were a metaphysical principle.

The elite are a savvy and cunning class. They play to win. So far as they escape the notice and scrutiny of our popular media and discourse, this is certainly by design. The organs of information dissemination and definition, from media to academia and nonprofits, are owned and controlled by these elites, and just as one does not tend to air their own dirty laundry on their social media, so the elites tend to give considerably more attention to the faults of the people over which they rule. Thus popular opinion is rife with conflict and concerns with grievances and faults in others. In all the chaos many people – probably the overwhelming majority in fact – never realize the true source of their problems, and tend to form their theories around the immediate instrumental utility of deferring blame and putting it on others, so that in the case of political reorganization by policy and legislation, it will be their opponents whose interests diverge from their own who will be advantaged less than they, or else disadvantaged more than they.

So, for the sake of incorporating much the phenomena that has already been gathered together under other popular theories, and elaborating in a way that makes sense of the world with reference to those things which people already understand, I will lay out my own analysis in familiar terms. Call this, if you will the control theory of the Cathedral. Where I will diverge from this analysis by Moldbug is in distinguishing “the Cathedral” from the elite, who rather than necessarily being parts of the Cathedral, operate through the Cathedral as a mechanism to control and regulate society in pursuit of their own interests, regardless the language of interest utilized by the Cathedral to effect that control and regulation of the mass of the people.

The elites are not leftists. Nor rightists. Of course it is easy enough to point out numerous examples of elites giving vast sums of money to causes and movements and institutions that have a definite political characterization. Koch, Soros, Thiel, Dorsey, Zuckerberg, and so on, are less ideologues than they are live players. Ideologues are subordinates of their ideology – these men put ideology beneath them, utilizing ideologies like one would a particular programming language to make a computer produce some result. For example, one points to Dorsey giving Ibram X. Kendi $10 million. Many conclude from this the startling idea that Dorsey is subordinate to Kendi! If one thinks about this for a second, it is rather silly. The money is flowing from Dorsey to Kendi – Kendi is the dependent. To be very provocative, we can easily determine that their relationship is as master to slave – I leave you to figure out whether you are the master or slave with respect your employers who pay you for the work you do for them.

We can inquire easily and even a little cynically what kind of move Dorsey is making by giving such a tidy sum to Kendi. Now Dorsey owns Kendi. Kendi, the incipient prophet of the emerging woke ideology, is in the pocket of Dorsey. To live players, the meaning is very obvious. Dorsey is freed to act with a great deal of latitude, and Kendi must rise to defend his lord. If Kendi does not, then everyone else who might give Kendi money, who might help establish Kendi’s popular position in the unfolding narrative and establishment as a man with considerable influence in determining and forming public opinion, will realize that Kendi is disloyal. If Kendi bites the hand that feeds him, other elites who might patronage Kendi will refuse him their help, and might even use their own organs of power to destroy him lest he use his influence to hurt them. To be a little uncouth, Kendi is Dorsey’s bitch. A rich and influential bitch, but a bitch nonetheless. Kendi does not possess power of his own will and person, but is dependent on power. He acts to create the consent required for the powerful to rule, like a priest who tells the faithful they are obligated to their king. He is an extension of the elite’s control, a representative who performs his service by the mastery of a popular programming language. It would be a mistake to identify him as an elite or to suppose that his opinion is identical or even aligned with his masters.

The same kind of analysis can easily be made for similar arrangements. When a man gives an institution or person money, he owns that person. That person now works for them, even if it is only in an informal manner. They gain control over that institution and its people. There is no reason they shouldn’t be willing to give money to causes that might not represent their personal sentiments, in fact there is great strategic reason in doing so, because their control of those institutions most likely to direct popular forces against them can now be flipped, co-opted so that they direct popular forces against each other – helping to secure the status of the elite, free from the bother of the people showing up with torches and pitchforks when they realize they’ve been sold out. This is why it is a grave mistake to try to infer the politics of an elite by which institutions they choose to give money to, as if they were giving money in the same way one of us would give money to Bernie Sanders or a charity. The elites are giving money to gain control over whom they give money to, and by extension indirectly the mass of the people that institution or person influences. The people give money because they are suckers. It is ludicrous to suppose that a person giving $50 to an institution because they believe in its purpose is doing so for the same reason as a person giving $5 million who is now basically free to call in favors through its network of influence.

So why does it seem leftism is more popular in these institutions used by the elite to launder consent? First, we might consider it tactically. Where the left and right are able to develop a mutual consensus on interests and so strive for policies to benefit them, this threatens the elites. But there are also deep and meaningful differences between the left. Since it is harder for the people to coordinate than the elites, it follows that conflict is more likely and easier to break out between left and right than they are to find consensus in their conflicts with the elite. One way or another, the left and right end up in a bitter fight with each other, whether by natural happenstance or by elite subversion – either way, the result is a cycle of conflict which will cause both left and right to expend the better part of their energies and resources on that conflict with each other. Eventually, a clear winner will dominate the other, and subordinate them to their own control of valuable resources in order to direct government to satisfy their interests to their own advantage even if to the disadvantage to the other. However, even though one side might come out the clear winner, it will be weakened by having needed to expend so many resources on dominating the other, and it will need to continue expending much of its resources to remain dominant. This makes it easy to control by a superior force, who can now make its prominent individuals and institutions dependent on them, and thereby control the entirety of the people through a willing faction satisfied by dominating the other faction.

There are other elements of strategy to consider with respect to the elite’s relationship with the people. Obviously, the elite would like to control popular discourse as much as possible. Regimes of universal censorship and suppression have proved themselves fragile, not because they are ineffective at regulating speech, but because in fact elites require the information that the people generate by unbounded discourse. In other words, there is more benefit to less bounded speech, because they are able to utilize the information created, and censorship regimes suppress that useful information as well, so that elites are unable to use their power and resources effectively and much of it goes to waste, putting them at a disadvantage with other elites. But there is nonetheless the incentive to suppress some speech, as a means of breaking emergent coordination among the people so they cannot band together effectively to press for their interests. Therefore, it makes sense to suppress some speech, but certainly not all. First, if one suppresses the speech of a particular political faction, it is likely to gain the support of the other faction, giving the elite 50% support in their actions. If they were to suppress speech more evenly across political factions, the result would be 100% opposition. Second, suppression of speech works as a favor to the dominant political faction through which they operate, making the favored faction easier to control as they feel their dominant position is secure. Third, they can suppress speech in one faction such that the information which is mitigated from developing makes it more difficult for the two factions to unite by the dominant faction realizing what interests they have in common with the subordinate faction such that they might work together to realize common goals against the elite.

We might also ask why the elites would control through the leftists, and why leftists seem to have come out on top. For this we can examine the interests that bind the left and the interests that bind the right, and what advantages and disadvantages those interests bring with them.

There are two kinds of factors to examine, and both will be required for a full decomposition of the circumstances that bind them. The first kind of factor is the essential – those innate qualities of individuals that predispose them to certain kinds of policies and considerations over others in pursuit of what they consider their interests. The second kind of factor is the accidental – these are the circumstances which are influenced by historical happenstance, which bring together groups by places and times such that they were moved to work with or against each other under the prevailing conditions of their time. Many times people confuse them with each other, by genuine confusion and oft by politically motivated bias. Political parties will, in the moment, present a principle as a matter of eternal and essential truth about the world, because such a principle, at that moment, is convenient to them – but then they will drop it and adopt another as time needs. Underneath this switching we can detect other principles at play, usually the historical factors that brought together those particular groups so as to constitute the faction in its present. Likewise, people will sometimes essentialize the accidental, by referring to the happenstance bringing together certain groups as though some of their qualities are what associate them to that faction, rather than some other quality beneath appearances. We will argue first by principles of pure reason to recognize tendencies in how people associate themselves, then draw out how history has tended to revolve around these essential considerations of the necessities which move people.

The broadest principle we can draw out to recognize the differences in how people consider their interests and what moves them to associate as they do is time preference. Time preference is, very simply, how willing one is to act so as to maximize the favorability of present circumstances over future circumstances. The higher one’s time preference, the more they prefer circumstances which suit them in the present, with less regard for the future. The lower one’s time preference, the more one considers the future, willing to forego present pleasures in order to satisfy an expectation that suits what they consider will be more favorable to them. Between left and right, insofar as we might correlate it as a spectrum to time preference, the left tends to higher time preferences and the right to lower time preferences. The left is more usually seeking to satisfy present needs and wants, whereas the right is more usually seeking to satisfy expectations about future needs and wants. Neither is “correct” in some absolute moral sense, but this tendency predisposes each to certain kinds of advantages and disadvantages.

There are circumstances which suit higher time preferences. If one is poor, one must do more to satisfy present needs and wants, because the past has prepared them less to have those resources already at-hand to them in order to satisfy their present needs and wants. This means, for them, giving up the potential to save up resources for the future, because they have less margin available which they can forego for the sake of that future. Likewise, their experience might have taught them that, when they do save up, they are unable to realize the benefit of those saved resources due to some unexpected setback, meaning they gave up some present benefit for nothing. Therefore groups which are more disposed to being hand-to-mouth in their circumstances are oriented to the left. They seek welfare and protections so that their present circumstances might be more favorable.

There are circumstances which suit lower time preferences. If one is wealthy, they have a much greater margin of wealth which they can forego consuming in the present in order to save or invest it in projects that will deliver them even greater abundance in the future, under the expectation they will be able to enjoy it then. If one has children, then one feels intensely the need to forego one’s own benefit in order to benefit their children, which means giving up many present pleasures. It also disposes one to consider how society will be after they are gone, and hoping to benefit their children in that future, they will tend to orient to the right with policies that are intended to maintain the benefits of civilization which not they but their children and children’s children will enjoy.

Again, these are not value judgments. However, obviously, when there are limited resources at-hand, and many groups must vie with each other to determine how those resources are used, and resources being used for the sake of the present mean giving up them up for being used in the future, and vice versa, conflict will be intense. One can certainly make up their own mind with a subjective evaluation about who deserves to have more say about how resources used, but that is an entire other discussion from this one – we are, rather, seeking to understand the layout of the land.

Such an essential factor can help explain certain distinct phenomena observed in our present politics. Families – or, at least, married men and women – tend to vote much more conservatively than the unmarried. This is due to their lower time preference, because they feel much more tangibly, by having children, the significance of the future and civilization beyond their own lives and what they will be able to enjoy. The non-reproductive, e.g. LGBT, tend to vote much more liberally, because they have a higher time preference focused more on themselves, as they are far less likely to have children and therefore feel less tangibly the significance of the future beyond their own lives. To people who do not and will not have children, whatever is not consumed by them in their own lives will simply not be consumed by them, and means giving up what they could consume that does not impinge on their interests for the future of civilization beyond them. In other words, it is rational for the non-reproductive to consume everything they can now, because what is left behind will not be left for anyone they care about, at least not as tangibly as parents feel about their children.

This means groups with a higher time preference tend to aggregate in the left, and groups with lower time preferences tend to aggregate in the right. Their interests give them distinct advantages. The left has more advantage in the present, because as a group they are willing to use more resources to win now, because they are less concerned about making sure there will be more resources in the future. The right has more advantage in the long run, because as a group they are willing to use less resources in the present but save them up and invest so that they and their children in the future will be afforded more favorable circumstances. Thus the two groups are bound in an eternal struggle, with each at certain points dominating the other, but this dominance can never last forever, as their success tends to undermine themselves in the long run as conditions change to favor the other.

As a coalition, the left is far more fractured than the right. The right has concern for their own children’s future as an interest binding the majority of its individuals. This means they have substantially more in common with one another – whether white or black, man or woman, citizen or immigrant – than groups on the left do. Each group on the left is defined more by self-interest, higher time preferences. Higher time preferences bring with them as a consequence interests which are more difficult to reconcile – gays have less in common with immigrants have less in common with blacks – than whites have in common with blacks and immigrants, via their common interest in having families (or, at least, in the long run, they will tend to revolve around that common interest, present defects notwithstanding e.g. the high rate of fatherlessness in the black community). Higher time preferences, higher entropy, higher disorder. In fact, this makes the left easier to use by elites as a control mechanism, because if the left tried to use their superior position to the right (under present circumstances) to exceed the elite, the elite could very easily play the differing groups of the left against each other. Most blacks and immigrants have more traditional sexual moralities and despise gays, blacks and immigrants compete with one another economically and politically for welfare, all the various kinds of gays and queers and lesbians and trans are at each other’s throats constantly.

The historical conditions bringing about the current circumstances are decades of economic prosperity and technological innovation. We are wealthier now than humans have ever been before in history, and it is easier than ever before to provide every person what food and shelter they require. Of course circumstances can be improved to make food and shelter even cheaper (and that is not a bad thing, as far as people trying to start families are concerned). But this abundance has also meant that people need care less for the future, and there has been a considerable buildup of entropy in these few decades, as our prosperity allows us to essentially treat the symptoms of this entropy with money. Eventually this will no longer be possible – but probably, we can manage to persist with some reforms here and there for another several centuries.

This hodgepodge of coalitions on the left can also serve to explain the Trump presidency, and why there were practically no gains for anyone during that time – because neither left nor right won, but the elites won. They had little power to find anyway to compromise with a president such as Trump, not because he was so opposed to their interests, but because the elites made it a defining feature of leftist affiliation that one needed to hate and oppose Trump at all possible costs. Trump is, in reality, an innocuous politician even if a brash personality. His policy positions put him just a little left to Clinton – Bill Clinton. As far as Republican presidents go, he was the furthest left of any Republicans, and only superseded in orientation to the left by Obama. There were obviously a number of policies that Trump would have been open to working on with Democrats, and he would’ve been very popularly esteemed by his own base at the same time. Instead, the four years of his presidency were stagnant, with nearly nothing being done. Why should this be the case, if it was in the interests of the left and right for him to succeed?

Of course, for Trump to “succeed” means only – being a popular president. To those who get their information only through the organs owned by a few billionaire elite – Trump was the absolute worst thing to ever happen, ever, a fascist who might even be worse than Hitler. We were promised lynch mobs and concentration camps and deportations and so many more horrible things. Republicans didn’t expect these things – at worst, the reasonable among them were inclined to hope for deportations of illegal immigrants, or at least the criminal among them as are allowed to flourish in places like San Francisco. He was never disposed to any of these things – he really only wanted to be popular. Which is not a useless personality trait. He is vain. He would’ve gladly signed many bills favored by Democrat constituents, like school reforms, prison reforms, healthcare reforms, and so on. If only they’d allowed themselves to compromise. But they couldn’t. Anyone perceived to even just compromise with Trump would mean cooperating with someone that everyone knew was a fascist, according to the media organs of Trump’s enemies in the elite. But why should the people care what the elite want about these things? Shouldn’t they have been willing to accept what they could get? In fact, the entire four years was an embarrassing and disastrous loss for the people, who have been set back by decades, if not an entire century, in pursuit of their common interests.

The left was corralled into shooting themselves in the foot by their elite controllers because it was in the interest of the elite to do so. All those policies and bills that the left desperately strive for which they could’ve had with Trump – foregone. Because any politician who compromised with Trump would’ve been anathema as well. Any compromise brought forward by Democrats that Trump would’ve gladly signed off on – it would have made him more popular, with both left and right, and, more importantly – it would’ve revealed he was not nearly as bad as he was painted. The fiction needed to be maintained, a delusional groupthink cult. We are not unfamiliar with these kinds of cult dynamics, where group cohesion dominates the way people think over plain common sense. I know my assessment is, at least in this moment, distasteful for those oriented to the left, but I’m also entirely certain they will eventually be persuaded to my way of thinking.

Trump was a disaster for the people. Not because Trump, but because Trump provoked a coordinated reaction by the elite. Why not just allow the people their few political victories? Because many of the elite depend on the way things are for their power and wealth. Perhaps they could eventually divest themselves from the current system and invest in a new system, but they could not have done so as quickly as required under a successful and popular Trump presidency. If the Democrats were allowed to pass those policies under Trump as are in their interests, it would have been a disaster. So let me repeat my conclusion about the Trump presidency: the left and right did not win – the elite won. And as far as most the left and right are both concerned, the reason they lost under Trump was because of the other side, which such a pervasive and popular opinion only goes further to prove how massive was the elite victory. The elite are only more in power. The left is all too happy to let Biden, “their guy,” do all the things they denounced Trump for, which he never actually did. The troops in DC may become a permanent feature. Biden is reverting to a business as usual in DC attitude. He will not give the left the policy victories they thirst for.

Another reason for the elite to withhold from the interests of the people, is that if they gave the people what they want, they could no longer promise it in order to entice people to vote. They would only be giving up their bargaining chips. It’s not as though there are fewer voters in response to actually receiving fewer of the policies promised them. In fact, it is the universal opinion of those on the left that this most recent presidential election had the most voters, ever. Those on the right who are more skeptical, are happily censored by willing leftist instruments of elite subversion. More voters, for delivering on fewer promises. That suggests very disastrous incentives for the people. The more the elite withhold, the more people vote, the more they only get mad at each other.

This is a short primer on our present circumstances, which I hope will illuminate my readers. It is important to remember and distinguish the elite from leftists per se. The elite truly interested in ideology for its own sake are the exception, and giving money to institutions and movements hardly signals personal alignment of sentiments. That is perhaps a good explanation for why these institutions and movements so rarely succeed – because despite their own clamor and funding, the elite don’t actually want them to succeed – because they are not, in fact, leftists (or rightists, for that matter).

The Bitcoin Nightmare Scenario

While I obviously hope this isn’t what occurs, one must sometimes give consideration to the potential downsides of the future. Perhaps, by realistically assessing such a potential future, we can find a way to prevent it occurring. If we do not at least consider its possibility, then it might take us by surprise, undoing a lot of the good we had intended. I am not elaborating this scenario joyfully, but soberly. I will keep it brief and I hope that what discussion this prompts will be helpful in overcoming these potential problems.

First, suppose that the Federal Reserve decided to start printing money and using that money to buy BTC. Perhaps they do it quietly, so at first people are unaware what is going on. The price of BTC, measured by USD/BTC will rise, and many of you will be very happy at this news. The Fed has many instruments by which it could go about making such purchases – perhaps it leans on legacy banking institutions to effect their scheme, or it puts pressure on new Bitcoin-oriented financial institutions. Either way, this is not impossible, and the Fed can use several different excuses for such an operation, such as “stabilizing inflation,” “reducing unemployment,” or whatever bullshit they want to use. It’s all bullshit, so it doesn’t matter, the point is they absolutely could and there is nothing stopping them from doing so.

Second, it wouldn’t matter if, even after people realize this is occurring, the price of BTC in USD rose arbitrarily. If BTC is $100,000 or $100,000,000,000,000 doesn’t matter, to the Fed USD is just bits in a computer which they can print at arbitrary values. You might argue this would be dangerously reckless, it would almost certainly cause economic catastrophe, and it would be harmful to 99.99% of everyone on the earth. This is true. But the Federal Reserve as such doesn’t exist to prevent reckless monetary manipulation – its explicit purpose is to engage in it. The Federal Reserve doesn’t exist to prevent economic catastrophe – it exists to secure the interests of the ultra-rich against the economic catastrophe it is bound to cause. The Federal Reserve exists to benefit the .01% at the expense of literally everyone else. It is an operation explicitly dedicated to robbing the abstract value right out of the money you hold, like it were magic. If you read the economic theory used to defend establishing the Fed or the monetary policy papers which discuss how the Fed can (and should) intervene in markets, this is explicitly acknowledged. The Federal Reserve could not do what it does unless, in essence, it were taxing the economy “out of sight” of shareholders and business owners and average workers (again – this is literally and explicitly acknowledged by the monetary policy papers which the Federal Reserve itself endorses).

What bullshit the Federal Reserve might make up to say why it is engaging in such a reckless operation is irrelevant. It exists to benefit a few extremely wealthy people. Bitcoin as a medium and service threatens the status of these very people. For the Federal Reserve to do what it must by buying up as much BTC as possible before anyone stops accepting USD for BTC is only in line with its purpose as it is actually used by those who control it. This would trigger a hyperinflationary collapse of the USD – and at the end the Federal Reserve (and those whom it exists to serve) would be secure in their continuing status as de facto rulers of the world.

What else might occur past this point could follow historical precedent. Undoubtedly the Fed would be unsuccessful at buying up every last BTC, and a few whales would still be out there who could offer some sanctuary for those trying to avoid working within the confines of the legacy financial system. But the Fed would own many BTC, perhaps even several million. Enough BTC that, in the wake of a collapsing fiat USD, the Fed could start printing US Dollars backed by Bitcoin. And they would have the political backing to do so, given the economic catastrophe they would have just triggered. We would be powerless to resist such a move – they would make the US Bitcoin Dollars legal tender which must be accepted as payment for debts, e.g. you couldn’t legally run a business or institution in the United States without accepting and making payment in US Bitcoin Dollars.

There is further historical precedent which the Federal Reserve could follow. Having established the new “Bitcoin Dollar” as their sovereign currency, they could 1) establish regulations prohibiting any from private individuals or institutions from transacting in Bitcoin, and 2) they could prohibit the private ownership of BTC, requiring all individuals and institutions who still hold BTC after the Fed crashes the party to sell their BTC to the Fed for Bitcoin Dollars at a rate arbitrarily fixed by the Federal Reserve. Then only the central banks of states might be allowed to transact in BTC between each other while citizens are required to transact in their respective country’s sovereign currency. This would be in line with the system that existed before 1971 and with actions taken by governments to dispossess their citizens of the capacity to transact in a medium they cannot control for their own purposes. Finally, any states or governments that don’t go along with the program can be slandered by the press owned by the same billionaires who stand to benefit the most from this financial system to create a justification for invading and overthrowing them.

From that point on we would more or less be back where we started. Even if central banks couldn’t otherwise mine more BTC than there will ever be mined according to its architecture, they can always just arbitrarily change the exchange rate for their currencies. Likewise, since the only institutions that will be allowed to actually exchange their sovereign currencies for BTC will be banks, you won’t be able to just take BTC out by any means but will be dependent, once again, on the same inflationary currency.

Even if the state must manufacture consent to make sure such moves by them don’t lead to an immediate outbreak of civil war and insurrection, it is obvious and easy enough for them to do so. They can just say that evil nazis and white supremacists are using Bitcoin to buy guns off the darkweb in order to do a terrorism, and Vox will write an explainer why the state needs to take away our rights in order to stop those dirty evil bad guys. If they need to they can always just manufacture a false flag and/or provoke actual nazis into doing something horrible to sell the propaganda. All of this is within precedent, and it fits the current modus operandi of the state.

There’s no particular reason to believe the current power structure will just allow its power to be threatened by people opting out of their financial system to use BTC instead. After all, they worked very hard on putting it together.

Contra Moldbug re: Zuckerberg

Not that I want this to blog to become devoted to countering Moldbug, but there are sufficient numbers who hang on to his every thought that his ideas require greater effort to contradict – for the sake of our spiritual health. Not so much for Moldbug’s sake but for the many otherwise clear-thinking people who have permitted Moldbug to become an authority that he isn’t and shouldn’t be. He has become a kind of Gríma Wormtongue, rasping his slithery little blackpills into the ears of a benighted movement, sapping what strength and conviction from those who have been taken in by his prior good advice. Reading his Big tech has no power at all it is impressive how diligently Moldbug dances around the key issue that belies his claim, and many are taken in by his ostentatious guile. Moldbug’s power to confound as a soothsayer, an opiate to comfort oneself by their powerlessness, is incredible. Yet it rests on a fundamental categorical error which is neither slight not subtle, but rather extreme.

To Moldbug and any others supporting his claim that Zuckerberg has no power at all, I propose a simple experiment. Simply allow me unlimited access to your private communications. Let me listen in on all your phone calls, let me read your emails, any messages or communications you transmit in public or private on any platform from Twitter to Facebook. Why should this be contentious? After all, Zuckerberg more or less has precisely that access to, if not your communications – because you are paranoid, any average person might say – then others around you, and yet he remains powerless. What should be wrong with such a state of affairs? What could I possibly do with such information, wherein you communicate things about yourself which are compromising (you cheated on your wife? well) or sensitive (so you’ve arranged a trip to such and such a place at such and such a time? hmm)? If access to such information would, say, grant me some specific and discrete amount of power over you, why would not the same access to the same information of – let me check – One Point Eight Two Billion Daily Users of Facebook result in Zuckerberg having a similar level of specific and discrete power over roughly that many people in the world?

Oh, but journalists might say mean things about Zuckerberg in the New York Times. Clearly we should esteem the prestige of the NYT, which Moldbug raises practically to the level of God, on the same level as a man with practically an NSA’s worth of intelligence on people from all walks of life all over the world. Sure, perhaps you have never really thought about how such information could be used, but that is because – if you allow me to put it bluntly – you are poor. Maybe you are not financially poor, but you may be poor in the sense of what you offer to Zuckerberg as a person who might be manipulated or coerced to help him achieve his goals. As it says in Proverbs 13:8 “A rich man may ransom his life, but the poor man hears no threat.”

And you have heard no threat, have you? Again, because you are poor. You are not a politician, or a celebrity, or a journalist, or a bureaucrat, or a police chief. Ah, but many such people use Facebook. No, not all of them, but one does not need to capture all such people to achieve one’s purpose. One only needs a bureaucrat here, a police chief there, a politician or two in one’s pocket – you can begin to see how Zuckerberg can easily wield more power than a mere journalist writing some bitch screed on toilet paper. You must ask yourself – who would be so foolish as to communicate something fundamentally compromising on a platform that others could see what you’ve said and what pictures you’ve sent and to who?

There are many Weiners in government, in bureaucracies, and so on. How many do you think there are that we don’t know about? But even if you haven’t been so foolish as to send dick pics to a minor (as many fools certainly have), there are other ways to capitalize on supposedly confidential information.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Zuckerberg wanted to get to you. Suppose, for example, you had the exclusive control over some intellectual property, a technology that he wishes to expropriate from you. Now, perhaps, in your wisdom, you have avoided using Facebook. So he cannot just read through your private messages there. Maybe Zuckerberg has not managed to ingratiate himself with the right people, such as Dorsey or Thiel or a choice selection of Google employees, who could extend his reach in gathering intelligence by perusing your emails or whatnot (though one should, obviously, assume such individuals are also using such power). Even if he has not, your wife uses Facebook. Maybe your mother, or an aunt. Some friends of yours use Facebook. People you consider part of your inner circle. The people you most depend on to do your business, with whom you collaborate, the people who could hurt you most. You are cagey. You don’t want to give up your intellectual property to Zuckerberg of all people – maybe it is personal, maybe you imagine you can make more money or gather more power to yourself by keeping executive control over its use.

Could Zuckerberg sabotage your business? Could he sow distrust among your employees? Could he make your company a dysfunctional wreck, ward away potential investors, manipulate the algorithm to expose more people to nasty things said about you? Imagine a businessman engaging in such dirty tricks. Has such a thing ever happened before? You really think someone would do that, hurt their competitor in order to gain from them something they want for themselves? God forbid.

In your strength, you would never sell your intellectual property for a billion dollars. But you go on vacation and it’s absolutely ruined by your wife cheating on you with a man who saw an ad on Facebook for a discount travel package to the same place and who also happens to be a notorious seducer of men’s wives. While you’re away one of your employee’s relationships ends disastrously and it severely impacts his productivity. Several of your prime employees are picked off by other companies through recruiters who saw them on Facebook. One of your business partners ends their relationship with you in favor of outsourcing to India, an opportunity that seemed to miraculously find its way to your former business partner through a fortuitous chance interaction in a Facebook group. Things like this happen. Now you’re disadvantaged, crippled, lame. A man shows up and says they want to buy your intellectual property for $50 million. For everyone unaware these circumstances, you come out looking like a winner. But you got – how else could one put it? – Zucked.

The above is somewhat fantastical but not unrealistic. It requires some creative uses of the information and mechanics of the Facebook platform, but certainly it can be wielded against you even if you don’t use it. There are much simpler ways to use Facebook to get at a person. You shared racy pictures and declarations of lust with a coworker. What a coincidence their Facebook gets hacked because they didn’t use 2FA and those sensitive details were shared with the world, and now your wife wants a divorce. Or you said something very uncharitable about a close friend and business partner and what you said finds its way to them. This is much more ordinary, and it is the kind of thing that can happen without anyone ever suspecting Zuckerberg might have been involved. Ah, but it’s paranoia to think that one of the world’s most powerful men would fuck with poor little old you – oh, you say he has no power but it’s still paranoid to consider that he might be the author of your misery? Curious. As Moldbug says, power is great at not being seen.

What we observe of the interactions between Zuckerberg and the press is biased. For one, it is the peculiar pathology of Moldbug and his devotees to lionize the power of the press. It is only slight exaggeration but not hyperbole to summarize Moldbug’s thoughts on the press by saying he believes it is essentially God. He doesn’t believe in God, of course, but then perhaps that’s why he esteems the press to such a degree. Pathetic. What he seems to believe in, more than anything, is his effete powerlessness. And he would like you to also give in to powerlessness, to abandon your strength, to not even try. Because if you tried, if you found you had power, then he would be wrong. And Moldbug being wrong is worse than him being right that you will all be ritually castrated.

Allow me to point out very clearly what we have observed, at least with respect to recent decisions by the tech platforms such as their banishment of Trump: the press sperged out for five years straight, making the most ludicrous and discrediting claims that only their most craven, supplicating minions take seriously, and that entire investment of resources, all that energy buys them… banishing one man from the public squares of the internet. Of course this is not insignificant, and it is a chilling precedent – one that will have serious consequences for the future of the internet and how we communicate through it – but one must keep in mind the dear price paid. Five years, the majority of their resources devoted to pushing this one thing. All that energy and prestige could have bought very many other things, such as real and much more influential policy victories that matter much more in the grand scheme of things. But no. The entire prestige of the vaunted, aristocratic New York Times and Washington Post and Vox and Buzzfeed traded to impress on people one singular opinion: orange man bad. Wow. If I rolled my eyes any harder I might just transcend time and space.

If the press were so powerful, it would not require such a great investment of resources to accomplish one single thing. If anything, this signals their weakness. A strong institution would not even need to demonize the president to get its way – it would simply subvert his power, or else seek to manipulate him to its own ends (as others in Trump’s administration did). A weak institution needs to vilify, to spread vicious lies. If the only way the press comes out on top of Trump is to use 100% of their available resources to do so – then Trump is equal to the press. Who would win? One man with a Twitter account, or a hundred thousand slavish sycophants?

To determine Zuckerberg’s real power we need only answer a few questions. How many politicians have communicated compromising material through Facebook? Of course they shouldn’t, but they do. Sometimes they even have good reasons to communicate explicitly through a platform which others can access – so they can communicate significant information to other parties while maintaining plausible deniability that they communicated any such thing to such parties. You think Hillary Clinton’s private email server, on which she put state secrets, was a mere error? Of course it was not. She explicitly set up her private email server so that it could be hacked, allowing those parties to obtain such information as they would like. Then money goes into the Clinton Foundation. Curious why anyone in Kuwait and Qatar would want to send an American politician millions of dollars. Can you figure it out? I think you can.

Politicians use Facebook. Whether in error or purposely, Zuckerberg can use that information to put them in his pocket. Perhaps those same politicians ask him pointed questions during a Congressional hearing so that people will think something is being done about something. Nothing significant changes, the play goes on. Okay, so that’s politicians. What about celebrities? Easy enough to ply them into giving public support to a particular cause by finding out their interests by reading their private messages. Simple. And Zuckerberg never even appears as an efficient cause in the whole process. Moldbug is right! Power is great at not being seen!

Government bureaucrats? Okay, so Zuckerberg does a friend a favor by getting that bureaucrat to prioritize his application for something or other. Police chiefs? There are at least ten thousand police chiefs in the United States, each with their own jurisdiction. After all, the Satanic pedophile cabal must find somewhere to engage in their sordid kiddie fucking rituals. A police chief in your pocket who looks the other way – even better if they’re a mason who will actively help. Is that power? Seems like it.

Ah, but journalists! The fifth estate! The clergy of our time, our sole and exclusive authorities in interpreting the meaning of events, who can excommunicate and anathematize whom they will! Of course kings and queens knelt at church. So do our elites, and so does Zuckerberg. Does that put them above Zuckerberg? No. In fact, they are as responsible for laundering his power and prestige by their antics. They write a nasty article about some of the distasteful business practices at Facebook. People talk about it for a day. A rumor that Facebook employees are organizing to force through a progressive censorship scheme on the platform goes around. Some groups get banned. Everything continues on, Zuckberberg’s essential power unperturbed. All that we see of Zuckerberg in the press as much hides the reality of his power as Moldbug would suggest it means he has none. Of course the media is never going to admit to its impotence. If journalists wanted to actually destroy Zuckerberg, to disrupt his power structure, to put him in jail for facilitating the trafficking of children to political elites in order to guarantee their loyalty to him? They’d disappear. They’d end up in jail. They’d be run out of the profession. Priests and kings have always been contentiously opposed to each other, vying to absolutize their own respective spheres of power, the eternal and the temporal. It has always been this way – and it remains that more power is with the king, whom priests seek to make him kneel because of the power he has. Journalists wouldn’t really be scoring anything meaningful for their resume if Zuckerberg were powerless. No one cares if you squash a bug – they care if you conquer a whale.

What else could a person say to argue that Zuckerberg is powerless? I could at least respect if someone suggested Hegel’s master-slave gambit, which at least has a respectable pedigree even if I otherwise find it wanting. So a man in power depends on the organization of people around him to exercise his power, and could not exercise it otherwise? Fool, that does not mean he doesn’t have power – that is power. That’s what power looks like. Having friends who will collaborate with you and minions who will do your bidding. That is power. Perhaps Moldbug is unaware that this is what power is, because he’s never had it. Or maybe he had it, but failed to recognize it for what it was and the opportunity to use it escaped him. Either way, Moldbug is clever in how he fails to see power, but his cleverness is not the same as proving it isn’t there.

Such an incurable contrarianism is not good. While we are always impressed when someone manages to twist words into proving an unexpected truth, this does not mean all unexpected propositions are true. Sometimes the reality is rather obvious and impossible to disguise. Zuckerberg is obviously powerful. The above has barely intersected his operation. Facebook – and its connections to institutions such as Palantir, the NSA, and so on – should be considered as a de facto intelligence operation. Not a psyop per se, or even necessarily a vicious operation. Much good has flowed through Facebook, and it will continue to be useful for us. So sometimes the weakest and most deluded members of “our side,”
which are, who exactly? QAnon idiots? Really? It is better for us they have been purged. Fewer idiots to dilute our attentions, devotees of a quasi-cult that was almost certainly created by our enemies to raise up scapegoats who could be ritually castrated as stand-ins for us. Perhaps the tech elite are /ourguys/. Meanwhile the “other side” accumulates cancerous detritus.

Why is this discussion important? As I said, not for Moldbug’s sake – though I do hope for the sake of his soul he will heed my words – but for his devotees. After all, I used to be such a person, and even if now we find disagreement I take his words seriously. There are many things he has illuminated – how to get and use power is not one of those things. It is important to recognize how power actually forms and organizes itself because then we could better position ourselves to strive for that power and use it ourselves. Yes, our enemies are powerful and many, but they are not infinite. There are many of us, we are more intelligent, and we have God on our side. I’m not making a rhetorical flourish here, I mean it. God is on our side.

If anything, Zuckerberg should be considered an ideal for us. An archetype, a king. In the beginning, there was no Facebook… then he created it. He did not take power from others, or have it handed to him by others who had gained it for themselves – he created it. He created a massive information attractor that has given him a position unique in society which did not exist before. The platform of Facebook is, in many ways, why we are even having this conversation. The journalists, if they could, would abolish Facebook entirely, and this they are patently unable to do. The very existence of Facebook as such is a medium which transforms the n-dimensional space along which vectors of discourse flow. While we concern ourselves primarily with the content, the content is only the matter which is formed by the medium, if one follows McLuhan. I have described before how the internet’s existence as such deprives journalists of much of their power, and this trend towards their ultimate obsolescence is only accelerating in the very phenomenon which Moldbug takes to prove their power. As the printing press was to the Catholic Church, so too is the internet to journalists. They won’t go away, but they will be forced to adapt in a way that gives us an edge.

The sense of powerlessness which Moldbug exudes is poison. It must be resisted. I hope Moldbug’s despair will be broken by an irresistible hope in the Good of our mission.

The Foundations of the Cathedral

The year may be 2020 but that does not mean we can yet take for granted that everyone equally understands how or why there is a “Cathedral.” In fact, based on my interminable reading of blogs and essays intended to describe such a regime, even those who directly task themselves with expositing its reality yet misunderstand it. They are (usually) caught up in appearances and fail to penetrate to the heart of the matter. There is a primary focus on the dialect of the Cathedral, its language, creed, and assumptions, but far less in examining why such patterns have developed. What attempts are made to trace its descent do so speciously, assuming the superficial presumptions of the language by which it describes itself are the efficacious elements rather than a cover so the true mechanisms can operate illegibly, undetected.

A minor controversy from the summer is indicative. There was a rumor of employees at Spotify agitating to impose thoroughgoing censors on the newly acquired Joe Rogan, who had agreed to host his podcast at Spotify for $100 million. “Of course,” the reactionaries decried, “they would defang Rogan of his claws all as part of a nefarious plot to control the discourse.” Now I am not pretending such agitation at Spotify – from low-level employees – did not exist. But the rationale for such agitation was too easily attributed to a direct attempt at promoting the ideological regime. More likely, such agitation represented a sycophantic attempt to burnish resumes and establish career bona fides. “I successfully promoted a policy at Spotify to guarantee that all content hosted by the platform would support pro-social initiatives” looks better on a resume than “I did my job exactly as I was hired to do and did nothing to stop a content creator contracted by our company from pushing ideas we find icky.” The stricter standards of the prevailing ideological regime merely provide a vector around which to coordinate, an excuse, a means to an end. The end, underneath the appearances of language, is building up their careers. The clear and easy to understand initiatives of diversity and so on were the means.

Nothing conclusive came about as a result of the agitation. Several dozen of Rogan’s episodes, especially those featuring the most bombastic guests such as Alex Jones, are unavailable on Spotify, but otherwise there is no certain sign of a comprehensive censorship in place. While it is obvious enough this has to do with making token concessions to the woke crowd, neither is it a complete submission to any would-be censor. Rogan is walking a fine line between maintaining his audience (his show is the most popular podcast hosted on Spotify by far) and avoiding doing anything that would get him forcibly ejected from the establishment, which he has definitively joined. It may not be ideal from the perspective of welcoming more conservative and reactionary voices into the narrative mainstream, but neither have any would-be censors created a position for themselves as commissars. At the end of the day, Spotify is trying to make money over enforcing a monoculture. Likewise, it does not seem like the most equitable strategy for a progressive zealot to stamp out a contrarian voice such as Rogan’s (and his guests) by giving him $100 million. After his tenure with Spotify, Rogan will have enough capital to start his own media company if he so chooses, extending his legacy far beyond himself even past his death. What some see as a scheme to “buy off” and “control” Rogan depends on assuming several rather dubious premises rather than gathering in the more obvious reality.

In the case of Rogan, the Cathedral did not win. Neither did it lose. It simply incorporated an element into itself to improve its adaptability and sustain itself over time. This is how systems persist. They adapt. They incorporate elements to themselves necessary to keep it all going. They shed elements that are determined to threaten its continuity.

The typical popular history of the Cathedral, as described by self-professed reactionaries, goes something like this: once upon a time, there were some people who decided to give allegiance to the ideological projection known as progressivism. This happened at a discrete moment of time, although the precise dating may differ from account to account. What all these accounts agree on, however, is that the choice was determined by moral affiliation. People were not choosing employees or how to keep their businesses going, they were making a moral choice about which the economic and social realities had no impact for them.

Of course this is a crude summary and individual reactionaries are apt to differ on its points. But these are the underlying assumptions that build up their narrative. They see it as a devolution – starting from an original goodness, a traditional Eden – the system gradually debased itself so that it came to reflect entirely different values. Putting it so directly makes it obvious enough the reality must be something else. Changes occurred, but they were not necessarily changes from “a good way for getting things done” to “a bad way for getting things done.” It was somewhere more in the middle, and was rather always like this. The system didn’t start out unfucked and then became fucked. Rather, it was just always fucked. The young who grow up and join the system, becoming employees, workers, founders, and so on, were entering a system that bootstrapped itself from nothing into something.

When we look back on the good old days, what makes up our picture of those days tends to be the elements that sustained themselves to our present. Naturally, this means our idea of the past is subject to a survivorship bias. Most of the things we know from the past and which are still with us have persisted from the past to the present because they were, and still are to some degree, good. The bad things from the past, of which there was plenty and just as much then as there is now, did not persist. Companies with bad hiring practices and a bad vision of the future died off or were acquired by their more successful competitors. So it was then, so it is now. The “traditions” we take for granted as being known today were not necessarily known then, and became known as such today because they were good in practice so as to persist until now so that now we know them. It is easier, after watching others try something many times over, to pick out the few who were successful and copy them. But that practice now as then was experimental and unknown. They were acting uncertainty as we do now.

The fact something has persisted over time as a practice is a good recommendation for it. Probably no such system that completely ignores the practices that have persisted from the past until today so as to become traditional can itself survive. So naturally tradition will be followed, as least up to a point. Copying what others have done that made them successful is a good way to find some of that success for yourself. But to go on and outcompete the traditional practices requires innovation, which means one must go beyond tradition. Ever has this been a thorny problem for reactionaries, which is that persuading others to follow tradition requires innovations to counter the novel developments of civilization which those traditions themselves do not already encompass. Every system that ingrains a behavior runs into the problem of positive feedback – if your behaviors are successful in generating new scales of capital, that new scale of capital as such becomes a novel element of the environment which the behavior itself has not already incorporated, and in order to incorporate it requires innovation. What will we do with all this new capital? All these new people?

This problem has been given a canonical formulation by Joseph Tainter:

More complex societies are more costly to maintain the simpler ones, requiring greater support levels per capita. As societies increase in complexity, more networks are created among individuals, more hierarchical controls are created to regulate these networks, more information is processed, there is more centralization of information flow, there is increasing need to support specialists not directly involved in resource production, and the like. All of this complexity is dependent upon energy flow at a scale vastly greater than that characterizing small groups of self-sufficient foragers or agriculturalists. The result is that as a society evolves toward greater complexity, the support costs levied on each individual will also rise, so that the population as a whole must allocate increasing portions of its energy budget to maintaining organizational institutions. This is an immutable fact of societal evolution, and is not mitigated by type of energy.

[…] the increased costs of sociopolitical evolution frequently reach a point of diminishing marginal returns…. After a certain point, increased investments in complexity fail to yield proportionately increasing returns. Marginal returns decline and marginal costs rise. Complexity as a strategy becomes increasingly costly, and yields decreasing marginal benefits.

To put Tainter’s insight most simply: increasing complexity is required to coordinate the movement of increasing numbers of people and resources that makes up social systems, but the marginal costs of increases to complexity eventually become greater than the marginal returns of that complexity. In other words, the success of a system eventually becomes its downfall. What this means is that successful traditions, those which we are disposed to call traditional because they have persisted, are themselves responsible for the new conditions created by their success. To succeed in the newly created environment will require adapting, jettisoning some of what came before and incorporating new elements as necessary to sustain the increased complexity of the system that only came about as a result of some of the traditions it is now letting go.

In other words, success drives change. Traditions undermine themselves. The picture with which we are familiar has made itself familiar for the very reasons we must move past it. At least, insofar as these changes are necessary to maintain the current complexity and its continuing growth. Failure to continue growing is death – capitalists and their investors are not looking to fund structures that deliver no profits. At the very least, following the laws of necessity that determine growing systems, we can examine the system as changing for rational, legible reasons associated with the necessities of demonstrating material returns. We can circle back to people’s beliefs, the most apparent features of the Cathedral, but we are speaking here of its foundations, its genesis.

The Cathedral is fucked. Everyone knows this, no one disputes it. Even those identified as the adherents and progenitors of its prevailing ideology agree the system is fucked, albeit with a different understanding of its reasons and potential solutions. The system is fucked because it always was. The people who now make it up were themselves able to get by as individuals by giving up some amount of idealism and embracing the fucked up system as it actually is. A fucked up system following its own fucked up rules is not going to create an unfucked system without either a miracle or a really, really long time to optimize without any exogenous setbacks (which is another way to say, a miracle). We don’t have the time and resources today to unfuck the system because it’s fucked, and neither did those who came before us. It’s always been fucked and always will be fucked. A whole lot of fucked can only go on to create more fucked. What improvements that do occur to solve some part of the system’s fuckedness only creates more resources and people that require increasing the complexity of a system that is already fucked and can only increase that complexity through the protocols actually vested in the system which are themselves fucked.

In short, it’s always been fucked and always will be. It seems pointless now to ask why the people who came before us who were born into a fucked up system didn’t unfuck it. All their power to unfuck the system depended on the very system itself to do the unfucking, and since it’s fucked to begin with, well, there you are. Do you believe that fucked systems can create an unfucked system? Of course not. Start with entropy and you end up with entropy.

Now, I would not identify the system’s being fucked with its being disordered. The system is fucked up in precisely the ways we require to counter disorder, at least to a degree necessary so that we are comfortable enough we are not willing to go on and create more fuckery. In a certain sense, a fucked up system must necessarily be the least of all possible fucked up systems, or else we would change it. All this together leads us to shy away from overtly ideological narratives about how the system “became” the Cathedral. The Cathedral was, as a matter of evolutionary descent, simply downhill of the form of the system that came before.

The system that came before, the “proto-Cathedral” if you will, had every logical reason at every step of the way to change in precisely the way it’s done to become the Cathedral that is now familiar to us. The Cathedral is, in fact, traditional in that it embodies practices and behaviors that developed before which found success in it and are now perpetuated on that basis. It is even supertraditional in that it has developed so as to accommodate the increased quantity of people and resources it organizes within itself that were themselves the product of tradition. What has changed is how we stand as individuals before it, and what features of individuals it chooses to promote.

The wokification of the Cathedral – if the process and form that contains it can be so neatly separated – is downstream several mechanisms that have themselves become reliable features of the system because they were successful at incorporating the increased levels of complexity created by those before it. These mechanisms selected for woke attitudes indirectly, not because those attitudes were thought to represent some leverage or opportunity for further gain, but because the features which were directly selected for were increasingly correlated to such attitudes. The attitudes themselves, when manifested, contribute to their own dynamics of selection, threshing out a consensus at the level of those incorporated into the system on the basis of other, more essential traits correlated to that predisposition. Thus, a focus on the woke attitudes themselves is a lot like trying to explain a delta without considering the river bringing all that sediment downstream, even if the attitudes themselves follow their own logical dynamics. In other words, it is too easy to become enthralled by the superficial features of the phenomenon, the things people say, and completely overlook why people who would say those things were selected for in the first place. This is the most typical mistake in explanations for wokeness, and since they confuse the causality their prescriptions are equally specious.

I am going to call this tendency of reactionary discourse to elevate the language of the Cathedral’s prevailing ideology “the literary delusion.” It is so naturally appealing to reply to words with words, to assume they are directed and determined by a decision framework we can agree on because it would be mutually beneficial to us. But the problem is that the words are not chosen for themselves, to self-consciously promulgate the woke ideology – again, the ideology is the means, a vector for coordinating one’s activity to the personal ends of career and ambition. They are chosen because given the immediate circumstances those speaking are actually in, they seem to have a reliable enough capacity to help someone get what they want. This isn’t to discount a fair amount of cargo-culting that is likely to be going on – someone sees someone say woke things, that person gets promoted, so they get the idea saying woke things will get them promoted. And perhaps they are right, in their particular circumstances, and thus saying woke things – regardless whatever other externalities we might associate with the meaning of those words – is rational for them, insofar as it was instrumental to their promotion and their job security. In fact, job security is probably a greater part of the reason wokeness prevails in the Cathedral, especially at its central nodes (e.g. Harvard, The New York Times, and Google). But the conditions in which such attitudes could be instrumental to success to begin with were not, in fact, the attitudes themselves.

In that sense, the “actual meaning” of the words as we interpret them would seem to inevitably veer into a territory implying negative externalities for others. People are apt to be responsive to conditions as stimuli implying positive or negative effects for themselves before they are able to realize whether those stimuli might imply positive or negative effects for others. Hence people are apt to promote language that benefits their immediate circumstances despite some other, far downstream effect it might have for others. They are not choosing their language to hurt you, it’s just that the language benefits them in their immediate circumstances. This is a “natural excess” of social systems where words that might float freely between institutions and populations which benefit those in certain circumstances go on to curtail the opportunities of others. People tend to engage in activities that directly benefit them even if they realize negative externalities for others. It has always been this way. That is not to say it is “good” in a pure and perfect sense, but it is to recognize that those wielding the language do so for rational, self-serving reasons. Any attempt to change the system must address those personal interests on which the language is staked.

But why do these excesses develop in the system, rather than others? If you take the whole of society and plot individuals along an axis, you will get a distribution. Whatever value you are measuring for, whether it is a tangible trait or something more intangible, people will naturally differ according to the innate and environmental conditions making them. Some are smarter, some are taller, and so on. The most significant of these traits is time preference.

Time preference is, simply, one’s relative predisposition towards consumption vs investment. Given an amount of resources, how predisposed is a person to consuming those resources in the present versus holding off on consuming those resources to invest them in a mode of production that might yield more resources in the future? For example, if you had a million dollars, how much would you designate as spending money and how much would you set aside for investment to realize future income? Some people are highly predisposed to the present – they would blow through the million very quickly, spending it on drugs and travel and lavish living. Some are more predisposed to the future – they would try to live on the million for a longer period of time, perhaps putting some of it into investments that realize more income for them later on. Maybe they invest poorly so they end up having less money to spend on themselves than the person who blows it all immediately. There is, nonetheless, a distinct distribution of people in society, some who are more present-oriented (we could also call them high time-preferenced) and some more future-oriented (low time-preferenced).

The single feature of life that creates the biggest difference in the population is having children. If someone has children, they are far more sensitive to concerns about the future. It makes them realize more viscerally that what they leave behind after they die will have a real influence on the lives of their children and their children’s children. If one considers the two natural populations in society between those who want to have children and those who do not want to have children, the population preferring to have children will naturally have a much lower mean of time preference (they are more future oriented), whereas the childless population will have a much higher mean of time preference (they are more present oriented). In both cases their attitudes are rational. If you don’t have children, then anything you don’t consume before you die is just getting left behind to others. If you do have children, then anything you consume becomes something you can’t inherit to your children.

The complexification of civilization as it grows is predisposed to favor those traits of individuals that make them amenable to fitting into the system even if at their own (genetic) expense. In other words, a rapidly growing socioeconomic system that favors personal commitment to corporations as a precondition to success will tend to strip away all those traits of individuals that might make them less committed. This is not necessarily directly causal, e.g. the corporations themselves molding individuals to make them represent those traits they find preferable, but rather selective. Corporations choose those individuals who, assuming competence, display signals demonstrating their prioritization of the company and its goals. Especially the more prestigious and important the role, the more important an individual can signal credible prioritization of the business. And one of those most significant traits? Whether or not an individual has or desires to have children.

Any person who has children will tell you that having a child not only abstractly but viscerally changed them – suddenly the priorities and preoccupations they acquired as children and young adults become much less important compared to their child’s future. While individual parents might differ in their success and form of commitment to their children, as a group parents are far less capable of signaling or even credibly demonstrating their prioritization of any prospective company looking to hire. In fact, we would consider it even somewhat anti-social for a parent to prioritize the company they work for over their children. What this means is that, as a group, parents (and would-be parents) are a less valuable force of workers, in the sense that their children will take priority over their work. Those who don’t have and don’t want children become more valuable, since they have nothing holding them back from giving all their being to the company itself.

Combine this with a greater reliance on specialization, specializations that often take years to cultivate and acquire before becoming competent in the marketplace, and there thus develops a tendency by social systems towards higher time preferences as they mature. Companies prefer hiring childless people because they will prioritize the company. The companies, thus having a systemic bias towards childless people, are therefore also predisposed to embracing and perpetuating the attitudes associated with being childless. This includes higher time preferences expressed as both a greater willingness to consume resources in the present as well as shaping norms to favor the childless. Certain norms in societies prevail around the world not for adults but for how they influence the development of children. This is why the Cathedral is “woke,” and it is also a description of the tangible vector around which the prevailing ideology forms itself – so that childless adults can consume more in the present. This consumption is manifested both by how they use and allocate resources (what they don’t consume now they will never consume anyway) and violations of “traditional sexual morality” that have probably developed to protect children rather than adults.

The moral and aesthetic preoccupations of this new childless elite are distinct as they become credible signals of that childlessness. Without “trying to attract a mate to have children with” as a constraint on how they look or act, childless cultures tend to thus “uglify” themselves, which makes a lot of sense given what we perceive as beautiful is nature’s shorthand for identifying suitable mates. A woman with short spiky purple hair, numerous piercings, arms covered in tattoos and wearing a t-shirt with a radical political message is probably a sexual turn off to most men, which is also the very thing that makes these features a credible signal of her pure and undivided commitment to Google. These signals also make it easy for her to find and coordinate with others of similar childless intent, and puts them naturally at odds with parents, even if the two groups might otherwise interact civilly in other settings. Since most norms of civilization have been handed down to us already because they were suitably future oriented, the dissolution of those norms thus becomes a rational goal for childless groups as these norms only hem in their consumption (of food, of property, of sex). The childless, without any tangible anchor to the future, thus threaten the future of civilization itself – there is no reason for them to leave behind a social inheritance because they have no children to leave such things to.

Hence, without intending to consolidate a woke legion, Google and many other institutions like it have, simply by systemically selecting for the childless, given the woke a great amount of power, and it is why they are wreaking what devastation to norms as they are. They are responding to their immediate circumstances, seeking to bolster their careers, improve their reputations, and ultimately set their status in society as high as possible. Of course they will use the tools and power at hand to dissolve those norms directly curtailing these ambitions. Of course they will laud childlessness and foist denigration on families and motherhood, of course they will seek to dissolve sexual norms that only inhibit the free expression they can indulge without concern for how it will affect children. All these things only represent to them norms curtailing their consumption, which they have no rational reason to uphold because they don’t have children who it will affect.

The solution to this is not, I think, trying to force people to have children who don’t want to have children. There are likely ways to regulate relations between those predisposed to childlessness and families, so that the former does not upset the norms and accumulation of capital necessary for continuity. In the Middle Ages, the monastery and convent may have been a suitable way to alleviate the wont of some to remain single. What the future holds for a solution I do not know, but I am sure that after a suitable amount of time the zeitgeist will swing back. Until then, you are all invited to assess the “problem” of the Cathedral anew with this understanding of its foundations.

GOP Delenda Est: A Response to Moldbug

I remember a conversation from years ago I had in DC with a political operative. We’d just smoked a joint out on the street, which seemed an appropriate way to celebrate America, and sat down at a local restaurant which I believe has been featured in one of the numerous TV shows about food. My friend asked me what should be done to forward the goals of conservatives, and so I told him “Destroy the GOP.” This was in 2014, well before Trump became a political phenomenon, and the track record of GOP candidates and presidents of my living memory – Bush, McCain, Romney – was enough evidence to rule out any possibility of a GOP candidate ever delivering on the concerns of conservatives. He seemed taken aback for a moment before the realization struck him. Of course destroying the GOP should be the goal of conservatives. The GOP was slowly suffocating us, reliably conceding all opportunities to improve our living standards to the Democrats so they could further structure all of America to provide them an eternal base of atomized minorities hooked up on the opiates of welfare and make-believe political fantasy.

Any candidate actually speaking to the concerns of conservatives would necessarily be an outsider. Since the Republican Party was dedicated to making sure all such candidates were insiders, whose own personal interests would align with other politicians before that of who they ostensibly represented, no such candidate could arise unless a billionaire went mad. Since that seemed very unlikely, destroying the GOP was the more viable option. With the power of the GOP destroyed, such outsider candidates would become the default candidates available to conservatives, who would be more apt to take seriously their role as a representative of their constituents. A new political party would rise from the ashes of the GOP, and conservatives would once again become a live player in the game of politics.

Then Trump happened. Was he a black swan? I don’t really know. There’s always people who say unexpected events are black swans, and some who argue it isn’t. He was, nonetheless, unexpected, and not a phenomenon I’d been banking on. My proposal was predicated on there being no such individual with both the resources and will to cut through the irreality machine of media. Even so, I remember exactly where I was when I watched Trump announcing his run, and that I knew immediately then and there that he would win. But it also implied my plan would have to be put on the back burner. Perhaps it was even a good thing, as it would buy time.

Since then events have played out more or less as I expected they would. For all the media’s excoriation Trump would never really rise to the role supposed by his most ardent supporters. The Republican Party resisted working with him, and the administration he put together were all a bunch of insiders. Granted, I thought it most likely he would win in 2020, since Biden was obviously a reheated turd who couldn’t offer a compelling vision for those he needed to vote for him. Perhaps I should have expected widespread cheating and fraud – a proud American tradition, I might add, in the vein of rum smuggling and avoiding taxes – but it is no matter. It simply means changing course with respect to changing conditions. We have plans for nearly any contingency. I have always believed that every changing circumstance simply means new opportunities, and Trump leaving the White House to be replaced by the turd burglar Biden simply means following one plan of action rather than another.

This is all a way to set up a response to Moldbug’s Vae Victis. There is also his Reflection on the Late Election. Both are, it seems, overtly mean-spirited. Moldbug acknowledges as much at the end of Reflections, and provides a potential means for Trump to slag his enemies on his way out, but the proposal is not remotely realistic. Not because Trump is weak, as Moldbug supposes in this case, but because he doesn’t want his whole family to be murdered. All his words in this case only seem to be about rubbing salt in the wound. “You stupid fucking peasant, how could you have ever thought a champion would succeed for you?” It’s a discouraging message, laced with venom, lashing out at the very people most likely to look up to him for a sign of hope which he rather seems to take a scornful glee in squashing. There is less a problem with the reality Moldbug describes – he is right, in a sense, that the election was “stolen fair and square” – but underneath is a vicious personality that seems to get in the way of realizing a realistic plan of action.

In fact, Moldbug has no plan of action, and he never has. He is simply not that type of person. He is a theorist, and always has been. His ideas might be useful for determining how to construct memetic siege weapons that us poor soldiers in the trenches could use to turn the tide of battle. But he is not a general, and frankly he shouldn’t be on the battlefield, spreading his vicious demoralizing bullshit.

To be frank, Moldbug does not know why he has found such a reception by the communities that have formed around and adjacent to him. Very simply, he elucidated the Cathedral, which provided a singular target which many of us could consensually recognize. He provided the information necessary for us to know where to turn our weapons, so that we could recognize the most effective targets to fire upon. That is all he’s done. We know that it is imperative to deliver the coup de grace to the unprofitable and withering media institutions that no longer merit their status in the age of the internet. We know that academia is a scam for churning out evidence of what people want to believe just as Christian apologists churn out evidence of Christ’s death and resurrection. This hasn’t changed, whether Trump is in the White House or not.

If one reads Moldbug backwards, he can be taken as suggesting that conservatives should reply to Democratic shenanigans with their own. While Moldbug doesn’t point to it, the SCOTUS’ rejection of the Texas lawsuit suggests a veritable opportunity for Republicans to simply adopt the same standards as their own. What does the Texas lawsuit argue? That the states of Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin intentionally changed their rules to make their own elections much less secure – in fact, they broke their own rules in practice, and what rules they did establish to cover their practices are probably unConstitutional. Texas alleged that these practices, since they affect the federal election of the President, which has significant importance for all states, diminished the Constitutional standing of their own citizens, essentially diluting the significance of their vote. This lawsuit was shot down by SCOTUS, on the premise that Texas “lacks standing.” What does this mean? While it does not rise to the level of officially written precedent, in practice it establishes that SCOTUS will refuse to adjudicate issues between states when one or other states allege that one or other states are engaging in practices that negatively affect them.

What’s the payoff? Well, one might say “eye for an eye.” So blue states are going to intentionally make their own elections less secure so they have cover for simply making up however many votes they want even if their own citizens actually prefer otherwise? Okay. Red states get to institute voter ID laws. They can require tests that demonstrate an individual’s mental competence in order to vote. All the policies that conservatives have always wanted they can have, and blue states can’t do anything about it. Fuck them. There’s no point pretending any longer that the given reasons against voter ID laws, that it somehow “suppresses voters,” isn’t just bullshit they’re making up so they can cheat. Go ahead and blatantly go against the federal government and SCOTUS. Dare them to use their military might, since it will be the only way left for them to still get their way in the lands they have abandoned.

Will Republicans do this? I suspect not, at least not without grassroots organization by actual voters to force their hand. And in the process of forcing Republicans to do so, or in the failure of Republicans to do so, each only gives conservatives a stronger base to ground their own organization outside the political institutions. This election was an affront to our dignity, and it should not be forgotten. It is really a blessing in disguise, an obvious enough vector around which we can coordinate without the meddling intervention of insiders whose incentives are to undermine the policies preferred by conservatives.

This all comes back to the Cathedral in the end. Finding a way to coordinate the conservatives, the outsiders, to achieve real political change. Over the dead body of the elephant. Preferably. Route around the predefined paths of 20th century institutions. Ignore the media, raze the universities to the ground. They are already irrelevant and don’t know it. We don’t need their clergy to interpret reality for us any longer – we now have the internet, we can see and decide for ourselves better than they. There is reason for Hope, and there is reason to place that Hope in our Good rather than the figure of Trump. Trump was useful, but he wasn’t ready to go all the way. We are.

I do not much like having to salvage Moldbug from his own bitterness. I understand he is older now, nearly 50 years old. He has an established reputation, a decent amount of money, wife and children. He’s made it already. His interest is in the promulgation of the current system in which his lifestyle and wealth is invested. He may have forgotten how hungry young 20-something men can be. I forgive him, but request that he also kindly fuck off the battlefield, because it’s just not his place. His concerns are not our concerns, our concerns not his. He can do whatever he wants with his own personal blackpills, stuff them up his own butt for all I care, but I’d prefer he not shower us with his shit.

Whether Trump leaving the White House is really a setback will depend on us, not them, and not Yarvin. How will we choose to respond? Will we work together, or bicker like all of you did for the last 4 years? It almost seems you need to be oppressed, in order to realize the necessity of coordinating together. Build virtue, make friends, become worthy. This remains the imperative. Become highly adaptable. Prepare to take advantage of any opportunity in our changing circumstances. Pick your battles.

I see a glorious future that Yarvin does not. I will lead you. I know your power and hunger. I will show you how to win.

Internet Protestantism and Sola Data

Imagine having this discussion with someone:

Them: “I’ve looked at the data with several of my peers, and this is what we believe it means.”

You: “Oh really? That’s quite a contentious claim, but I’m apt to believe it if that’s what the evidence really says.”

Them: “That’s really what it says.”

You: “Okay. Mind if I see the data?”

Them: “You cannot.”

You: “Why not?”

Them: “You might not interpret it correctly.”

You: “I believe I’m qualified to observe and make my own interpretations. If it aligns with yours, all the better for both of us.”

Them: “But you might not.”

You: “So what if I don’t? I have no reason to believe your interpretation unless you allow me to see the data for myself.”

Them: “That would be bad.”

You: “Okay, now I simply don’t trust you.”

Them: “If you don’t believe us that means you are bad.”

You: “Alright, now I disbelieve your interpretation, whatever the data may be, because you’re obviously hostile to me, which suggests your interpretation is crafted to benefit you and your peers at the expense of someone like me.”

This is, in essence, the stalemate between the public and the wider apparatus of information transmitting organs meant to establish the legitimacy of both the concrete existence of institutions such as the government and universities and the abstractions that ground the rules of public life such as science and political legitimacy. Journalists, “public intellectuals,” and other esteemed clergy of our institutions invariably come to the realization there is a crisis of the faithful. They decry disinformation and the like. A former president argues the theoretically decentralized infrastructure of pure information transmission, the internet, is a threat to democracy, because it leads people to form opinions he does not like. All these figures, from the greatest of statesmen to the least of Buzzfeed writers, are in a certain way right but unable to express the real problem, because the real problem is about an arrangement which it is verboten to admit.

The arrangement is in essence that the average man depends on, or has depended on, others to centralize data, interpret it for them, and relay the results. Of course, as a matter of fact some will always require others to interpret for them, but that is not the problem of which I am speaking. This arrangement occurred as a tradeoff between the utility of having that information in our society and the cost required in obtaining it. Information that one person has in one location requires some energy to transmit to another location, and hundreds of years ago the cost was necessarily enormous. A letter might be sent, but for it to reach its destination would require either the happenstance that someone was already going that way and willing to take it with them, or one might charter an individual or company for that express purpose. The former was a matter of luck and you’d need a way to trust that individual would neither alter that message or fail to deliver it entirely. The latter was expensive and out of reach for most people in most occasions. Either way the time required for the communication to go from one place to another would be enormous. If they were a few dozen miles away it could get there in a week. If it were across the world? It might take a year or longer.

Here the division of labor plays a role. With such high costs inherent to transmitting information, it becomes profitable for some to specialize. The information an individual or even a small group can gather together can be multiplied at much less cost for hundreds or many more people, utilizing the economy of scale to make the profits outweigh the costs involved with gathering that information. As time goes on, innovations come about that decrease the cost by a magnitude or more. The electrical telegraph was developed allowing for simple messages to be transmitted at the speed of electricity traveling along a wire. Eventually there came radio, computers, satellites, and the like. Within the span of only two hundred years, the amount of information we can send, and at very little cost, has grown tremendously.

As consumers adapted technologies like radio and then television, the potential to reach hundreds of millions of households gave a considerable advantage to those organizations which could not only gather the information they considered important, but could practice their information gathering technique in a way that the public widely considered to demonstrate their reliability. In other words, they were required to gain the public’s trust, and – at least to the satisfaction of people at the time, where there was no better alternative available – this they seemed to do. It was not, at the time, taken for granted that the public would trust them. In fact, it was rare for a country’s news organizations to gain the public’s general trust, if one compares the leading standard of Western news organizations to those found in countries such as the USSR.

It is ironic, then, in the wake of the collapse of states depending on state control and censorship of mass media, for so many of the clerisy of our public institutions to take for granted that they deserve our trust, and to react with hostility when we withhold our trust. They are like an abusive partner who, despite having been caught in numerous lies and boondoggles and farces, feel they are justified in simply threatening to or even actually “smacking a bitch about,” to put it in not so delicate terms. And so it has become cliché for journalists and social media censors to routinely slander all those who suggest or describe an alternative point of view, arguing that any who would deviate from their orthodoxy must have an evil, probably genocidal, intent at heart. Naturally, this hostility, both when it is threatened and when those they deem their enemies are officially ostracized – I mean canceled – only confirms to the average man they have no good intentions for us and as such they are not trustworthy. Whatever benefit such organizations and institutions might play in gathering together data and interpreting it for the mass, their habitual exploitation of their advantage over the average man has been observed and determined unnecessary.

Perhaps there is a non-pernicious explanation for the development of this state of affairs. As more and more people go online, and find there abundant all kinds of information on every topic, they have a means to learn for themselves and compare with the information they are being told by these clerisy. Naturally, since there are necessarily so many of these clerisy, their competence, high though it may be compared to the average in our society, must still be much less than many others. The smartest and most capable, especially at sifting through information and determining for themselves the truth, are found all throughout society, and most of them are not in journalism or academia. The money in these professions is often not considered good enough and the compensation they portend to offer in terms of prestige and status are increasingly considered not only insufficient but risible. The average man of intellectual constitution would increasingly prefer not to be mixed up with the clerisy, because they are increasingly found to be either impotent or, even worse, sycophantic. Often both.

While at first it takes time for the seeds of discontent to sprout, very quickly it becomes the considered opinion of outsiders that the “insiders” are incompetent. Likewise, since such institutions offer a veneer of authority to anyone willing to wade through the numerous layers of filth and shit that pervade these places, they attract those seeking to make use of their power to realize their malice. Most participants in these institutions are simply too stupid to realize the effect of their activities, and the few who do understand realize the necessity to clamp down on all who would deprive them of their legitimacy. This serves to give some explanation what we are seeing when the Twitter staff find it necessary to so rudely butt their way into our conversations to tell us what they believe to be “good information” and what is “not.” On a very charitable interpretation they simply do not realize what effect they are having, which is to further decrease trust in such “experts.” On a less charitable interpretation they are actively seeking to destroy and confound our ordinary means for developing consensus. Both these interpretations are roughly compatible, in the sense there are likely employees and individuals who are participating in this censorious system with their own ideas and intentions. Nonetheless, the result is singular – we cannot trust them.

Their efforts to frustrate the “spread of disinformation” only actually can frustrate collective epistemology as such. We are social creatures who know both through our own individual ratiocination as well as through the development of consensus. As such, Twitter’s official disclaimers – not to mention the “context” imposed by other institutions elsewhere – can only result in an inefficiency which the spontaneously developing system of information exchange composed by our social networks must expend resources to route around. This is because the emergent coordination exemplified by the development of our information exchange networks, which are both trivially obviously as such but also subtle in that the “meat” of exchange is often transmitted under a layer of exosemantic shibboleths, is good enough. As individuals we have a natural preference for good information over disinformation. We have an intrinsic motivation to sift out disinformation, and we are good at it too. In fact, a parallel situation as above has necessarily developed, in which we can observe our own elimination of disinformation is more reliable and precise than that exerted by Twitter, thereby leading us to disregard whatever efforts they might make on any issue in preference of our own techniques and knowledge.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, the Twitter censors are right about something. In fact, they sometimes are. But when they are right, we already knew that and could determine for ourselves. Thus, Twitter’s contribution is – in the best situation, when they are simply right! – is zero. It is a waste of energy on their part and becomes only a sign to ignore, as it can only confirm what we already know.

Now suppose, alternately, they are wrong. They are bound to be. Twitter employees are human, after all. The prestigiousness of their degree doesn’t matter. Their expertise in whatever doesn’t matter. They are bound to be wrong. And when they inevitably are, they discredit themselves. They become a laughable parody of censorship. We know they are wrong. They look silly. Are they merely incorrect, as a result of a mistake in reasoning? Perhaps. But neither can one rule out their false or misleading statements come from a place of malice, a sheer will to coerce belief where it is not merited. In such a case, the effect is decidedly negative. We distrust them to report the truth even when they try, and we recognize the utility there must be for some powerful actors to exploit such censorship protocols in their favor.

The result in either case is an overall reduction in the capacity for emergent consensus development. The effect is global, in that it affects everyone, because the generation of knowledge in our collective interactive behavior is something we all depend on. Even antagonisms and oppositions between actors and ideas are an essential element in the strength of a collective social system’s epistemology. In fact, the better our opposition, the better we must be, and so on, in a virtuous cycle. But diminish the potential for any opposition to be offered, and all of us must suffer a reduced standard of authentic knowledge generation. We are worse off for it. Even the Twitter censors themselves are worse off for it. It is a deplorable system that can only destroy knowledge and never create it.

In a sense, one might think of information networks like one does the body. It is already a feature of the body to detect and remove toxins and invaders. Certainly the body is not perfect but it is easy to overlook how well it does what it’s supposed to, without our ever noticing. The addition of some artificial construct, perhaps a chemical or antibiotic, can offer some benefit to the body in terms of restoring health, but this is the exception rather than the norm. Most of the time, the body is better equipped to deal with and heal from perturbations. In fact, and this is a very important point, the body must deal with adversity or else it does not develop resilience. If one interferes in the body’s own natural functioning, one is at risk of suspending or deteriorating its own systems that make it healthy and capable of overcoming resistance. In an information network, actors with an intrinsic motivation to realize the truth develop the memetic antibodies that spread to the other actors and help them to sift out the infotoxins. Suppress this natural immune response, and the act of suppression itself is likely to become the vector through which infotoxins are introduced at the same time the body’s own immune response is unable to resist. Censorship intended to promote health is actually iatrogenic.

(A brief aside: if Jack or Mark or someone close to them is reading this, I beg you to disband the censors. If and when you are questioned about why you aren’t “doing something” about disinformation, use the arguments I have offered above. People will get it. More importantly, you would restore some trust, and it will make things better for all of us. I won’t pretend it’s a silver bullet solution, but it is the right policy to optimize the health of our collective information exchange network.)

What’s the opposite of censorship? One part of it is not intervening. Another part is making more information available. I am not talking about the disclaimers inserted into our tweets or social media posts. I am talking about the information that institutions have and do not share. They often provide us their interpretation of the data, but this is increasingly becoming an impediment to legitimacy rather than the means of exerting it. If it is possible to share with us the source data you possess, yet you refuse, it calls into doubt how trustworthy your interpretation is. If the data were to be shared in addition to the interpretation, then others with an intrinsic motivation to discern truth will validate that interpretation, assuming it is. The validation by others of your interpretation of the data strengthens your interpretation and increases your own legitimacy. Such transparency might involve giving up the discretion social organizations now exert, making sure to condition their interpretations with the right “context” in order to lead the public to the “right” opinion, but in fact in an age where the opportunity to transmit information is so abundant and the cost virtually negligible, it actually discredits the institutions to some degree when they withhold that information. Share with us the data. It will be better for both of us.

This is an idea I would like to call Sola Data. We no longer require interpreters of the holy writ of data to tell us what it means, we are able and willing to interpret it for ourselves. We do not need an intercessor. Perhaps it helps some, but likewise so we can take on that responsibility for ourselves, and do a better job at it, because they are my people, and to you they are an other. This is nothing more than a struggle over who should lead, and we will demonstrate we are worthy of it by simply doing so. And it will be to each our mutual benefit. Of course one understands this means washing away much of the institutional structures that grew up in a time when the gathering of information and transmission thereof, but you must surely realize this is inevitable. They are no longer needed, they are obsolete. At this point they are vestigial organs which can only consume resources and interfere with the otherwise healthy functioning of the body politic. Let us the data for ourselves, it is all that is necessary.

This suggests an internet Protestantism. The Pope of Harvard and his College of New York Times Journalists is unnecessary for our salvation, and never has been. One can appreciate the role they played in tradition in those times when conditions were different, but now they are different, and it is time for us to grow and move on. The institutions of media apt for the 20th century information ecology are simply outmoded in the 21st. So the Cambrian period was succeeded by the Ordovician. It is no longer the time of the esteemed network journalist transmitting their information to passive millions. We are now in a much more interactive and accessible information environment, and the media – of all sorts – will adapt to it. More will people ask to just see the data thank you very much. It is the memetic equivalent to showing your code. If an institution is legitimate in its information gathering, then we will verify that in analyzing the data for ourselves. In fact, institutions from news networks to academia will increasingly make their data available as a means of certifying the authenticity of their knowledge generation. We will become a universal priesthood of believers, each having direct access to the data and forming conclusions on our own terms.

The Media’s Strategic Antipathy to Trump

It wouldn’t be new information to point out that the media has an intense prejudice against Trump, or even that this intense prejudice of a mainstream political candidate is rather novel in the history of American media. But the reasons which seem so obvious – the media has a decidedly leftist bias, and Trump is “so far to the right” – is in fact an illusion perpetuated by the very media itself. Actually, Trump is among the most politically moderate presidents in living history, with perhaps Obama being the only president to Trump’s left. This is as much a sign how far left the culture has generally moved over time as it is an indication of how much the media environment has changed. Although Trump is attacked as “far right,” the prejudice against him precedes the tendency to identify him as somehow far right, because he is too close to the left and therefore an even more effective threat to their power than a far right candidate would be.

This is the result of two concurrent effects. The first has been pointed out elsewhere, which is that the proliferation of social media has resulted in a much greater variety of perspectives available. On the one hand, the barrier to entry has been practically eliminated entirely, so almost anyone can start a social media account and begin promoting their own views. On the other hand, the greater variety available means a wide swathe of the mainstream media’s potential audience has abandoned them in favor of independent and idiosyncratic opinion-makers. This means, in order to maintain what portion of their audience they can, the mainstream media institutions have needed to diversify themselves, particularly by taking increasingly slanted views to satisfy the biases of their smaller but also increasingly militant audience. These effects have contributed to a vicious cycle, of media polarization driving political polarization of their audience, requiring media to become further polarized, and so on. There is simply no audience for a truly “neutral” media, excepting C-SPAN which bores even the most militantly neutral of audiences.

The second effect is can be attributed to Hotelling’s law. Hotelling’s law is the result of a Nash equilibrium causing producers to become more similar to each other as not. This can be explained as such: imagine a continuum, going from x to y. Suppose there are two producers who must exist somewhere on this continuum, a and b. Further, suppose the potential consumers of the goods marketed by the two producers are distributed randomly. Wherever a consumer is on the continuum, there are most likely to choose the nearest producer available to them. So, if a consumer is one unit of distance from producer a and five units of distance from producer b, they will be much more likely to frequent producer a. Thus, without otherwise having information on the randomly distributed location of consumers, producers a and b are likely to situate themselves as near the middle of the continuum as possible, in an attempt to capture as many of the consumers as possible.

This situation, with a and b tending to be very near each other in the middle of the continuum, is analogous to politics. In a winner-takes-all system like American democracy, there almost always develops a situation with only two parties capturing the votes of nearly all voters. The larger the party the more resources it has to effect its political aims, and likewise the more resources it has to appeal to voters and influence their preferred policies. Hence a two-party system is essentially the inevitable result with voters making a kind of negotiated compromise with other voters nearest their policy positions in order to actually effect them. Of course, there is the occasional upset, with third parties emerging to capitalize in exceptional conditions, but for the most part all participating voters end up funneling their votes to one of two parties – the individual voter is most likely to give their vote to whichever of the two parties the judge nearest their own policy positions.

In the real world, the situation is not so cut and dry as the idealized world of Hotelling’s law. There is a cyclical interaction between parties and voters, so that parties are not only situating themselves to appeal to voters, but parties as much participate in the process to influence voters’ policy positions as well as their perception of what is important in politics. What this means is that when a given candidate’s policy preferences are dryly analyzed, have policy positions that put them near the center, their opposition will have an interest in projecting the perception that candidate is much further right or left on the continuum than they actually are. This is so that, when a voter is deciding between candidates, and most likely to give their vote to the candidate they perceive nearest them on the continuum, if they perceive one candidate to be much further away than they really are, they will give their vote to the candidate who appears closer despite them being actually farther.

Hence the media’s vociferous hatred of Trump. Trump is a very moderate candidate, therefore threatening the Democrat party’s hold on their most reliable voting blocs. Because Trump is near the center, he is actually closer to some on the left than they are to the Democrat party. This is in addition to Trump having the most appeal to “natural conservatives,” giving him an edge in the election. Therefore, he must be intensely denounced and represented as far to the right as possible, lest the more left-inclined voters realize Trump is more likely to deliver on their preferred policies than the Democrats. The leftist media and voters alike, who naturally seek to improve their advantage, thus perpetuate a narrative where Trump is so far to the right he is more akin to Hitler rather than, say, Bill Clinton, who is probably the last president most similar to Trump’s policies.

Combined with tribal effects, where reward accrues to those individuals who can make the most extreme yet credible denouncement of Trump, the result is the popularly described “Trump derangement syndrome,” with individuals becoming disconnected from reality, for the simple reason it helps them to sell their act of denouncing Trump. If Trump weren’t denounced and instead recognized as perhaps the “ideal Democrat’s Republican,” whose focus on economic issues over race issues may have even saved the Democrats from themselves, then support among leftists would more likely flow out to Trump’s administration. Analyzed cynically, it even seems the incredibility of the denouncements are more intended to keep leftists fearful of defecting from the Democrat party’s consolidation of the culture. Likewise, given that perspective, this suggests that the Democrat party’s consolidation of voters is more fragile than before and therefore more apt to a large-scale defection event resulting in a reform of the Democrat party and an ousting of its party elites.

Cancel Culture as Ostracism

Whereas “Cancel Culture” is a seemingly novel development in the course of human society, in fact it is only the most recent incarnation of a group behavioral norm going back likely earlier than the emergence of hominids. From the earliest surviving records through to modern day, cultures have routinely practiced both official and unofficial forms of excommunication, banishment, exile, ostracism, damnatio memoriae, and so on. In that sense, Cancel Culture is not new except in the sense that it is a new version of something old. Likewise, these historical occurrences suggest that something like Cancel Culture – in the sense that a normal outlet of concentrated human behavior facilitated by social media is expelling individuals from respectable society – was inevitable.

Our platitudes and missives to the contrary, one of the reasons high school is such a treacherous place is because it taps into our most primordial instincts as humans. Our proclivity to socialize and interact with others was honed in an environment where popularity with the tribe was a literal matter of life and death (and reproduction). If your status with your tribe fell low enough, you could easily end up banished, killed, or cuckolded. On the other hand, if your status was high enough, you could have many times more children than others (if you were a man). While high school is (usually) not such an environment, the same impulses are at work in forming a circle of friends and, crucially, denigrating the status of others and refusing them to interact with you or your circle of friends. In the modern day, we do not often completely exile someone from society if they behave in a way that makes them unpopular, but their status can be affected enough to substantially reduce their opportunities in career and romance that people will struggle over scraps as if they were life and death, because they basically are for our genes. In contemporary civilization, we are not so uncivilized we will completely rid a person the privilege to benefit from our prosperous society as to eke out a living, but we will absolutely crush a person’s reputation to deprive them the opportunity to work a meaningful job ever again.

We are never not going to take into account actions taken by someone or aspects of their personality in making a judgment of them that will have a real impact on their life course. If someone is found distasteful to many, then even in spite of moral virtue and proficiency at the technical task, they will not be allowed in to companies. In a world that depends on cooperation and coordination, the ability to get along with other humans is always an advantage. Things a person says or does can color or impact others’ judgment of them, sometimes in such reliable ways, that people who make hiring decisions will not want to burden their workers with such a personality. Ergo, we can expect people to spontaneously act with a tendency towards barring people with unpopular traits from their workplaces. This is unlikely to change. What traits are considered unpopular may change, but so long as there is any competition for jobs then people will exercise their preferences to choose associating with people with more popular traits. It is just that the traits preferred by fallible humans with an institutional epistemology do not always line up the “objective” traits of natural excellence, meaning that institutions – at first in isolation but then systematically reinforcing each other’s deviation – can just as well end up preferring people with less proficiency at the technical task associated with their role. The competition over this fact, both in actual hiring tendencies and in discourse, is what is so contentious and where the heavy artillery of social exclusion are brought in to play.

This seems to be the central contention that causes people to bring up “Cancel Culture” as a specific phenomenon in order that we can get some grasp on its causal dynamic. It is not so much that people desire a world where popular traits are completely discounted in assessing individuals for a role, but that the dynamics fueling this specific and repeated form of social exclusion appear to have found a trajectory that may go beyond our control and resulting in widespread destructive consequences. We may or may not be able to actually do anything about the social dynamic at work in Cancel Culture, but there is still an understandable concern over bringing it under examination so that maybe we can mitigate its negative consequences and externalities if not completely eliminate it. Part of the dynamic itself is in making the phenomenon legible, for the reason that admitting it exists suggests it might be controllable.

The reality of Cancel Culture as such is not difficult to prove, in that it is only the recurring phenomenon of social exclusion. Being “Canceled” is not so different from being excommunicated in the Middle Ages. The difference is that, whereas excommunication followed a legible procedure with clearly defined rules for explaining why you were being excommunicated and what would be necessary for you to return to the fold, Cancellation has no such qualities. It is an informal process dictated by primal mob psychologies. A mass of unaffiliated individuals gathering together spontaneously to brand someone with a mark so that all will know this person has been unpersoned, who make no consideration for what will happen to this person afterwards. Without a formal process dictated by authorities following prescribed rules, this spontaneous mob process can easily lead to excesses and mistakes.

This tendency to excess and mistake is principally the concern of those opposed to Cancel Culture. These mobs can form unpredictably and they are unaccountable. The consequences imposed on seemingly random individuals are arbitrary and disproportionate. The reasons given and their justification are stretched to implicate everyone who might be skeptical of the epistemology promoted by participants of Cancel Culture. By denying its very existence, those with influence in the loosely affiliated subculture with a preference for social exclusion as a tactic that gets called ‘Cancel Culture’ sublimate their responsibility to regulate this mechanism of targeted social destruction. If it doesn’t exist, they can’t be accountable for it when its excesses result in destruction that goes beyond reason.

The Mexican day laborer who lost his job because someone took a picture and accused them of making a “White Power” sign? Who can he sue for this slander? Can he sue the person who originally made the accusation? Can he sue the people who found his workplace and demanded he be fired? Can he sue his workplace for firing him over false pretenses and/or failure to adequately investigate the evidence for the claims? Probably not. He is without recourse of means of redress for this injustice. But really he is just a casualty of this phenomenon. The proponents of Cancel Culture tend to target their colleagues, which suggests that Cancel Culture is vitiated by a cohort of younger professionals who feel insecure about their career prospects and for whom eliminating competition by requiring adherence to a specific creed increases their own opportunities and gives them incentive to promote it.

Ostracism was an official practice of the Athenian democracy. Individuals accused of betrayal of the common good of their fellow Athenians could be exiled from the city. In practice, it may have served as a tool for several influential Athenians to target their rivals and eliminate them from competition. This link to self-interested motivation suggests that a means to mitigate the negative effects of Cancel Culture is to formalize it, so that it is required to make itself legible and enter into an accountable relationship with other aspects of culture, which will naturally moderate its excesses. When there is some official judge of Cancellation, a reputation attaches to that individual, whose services in arbitrating the moral reprehension associated with the individual and their punishment will thereby be required to meet the standards of opponents. A system for managing accusations will have in its interest to foster reconciliation as that gets more people to support its purpose. Instead of arbitrary and senseless devastation wreaked by a mob of individuals with no fear of retaliation, we get a system where accusations are required to meet standards of evidence and recourse is possible for businesses and their employees to save face. This formalization creates a juncture in the culture where responsibility for long term outcomes is necessary and there is less incentive for society to just “throw people away” as if they are garbage and not people who will go on living, building up resentment at a system that excludes them and leaves them with nothing to lose.

This is where the collective long term danger of Cancel Culture becomes apparent. If mobs are able to arbitrarily execute the reputation of individuals online without fear that their punishment of others will become costly to them, then we result in a society with a “Canceled” underclass. This will include not only people who have been Canceled (and who probably imagined they never would be), but individuals who have removed themselves pre-emptively, sure that they’ll be inevitably canceled when they speak their mind in contradiction to the sensibilities of our current reigning preoccupations. They’ll see themselves as having nothing to lose and, unlike other underclass vectors that correlate to incompetence and therefore impotence, many of them will be intelligent, highly motivated, and prepared to coordinate with other pariahs. Such a group is much more likely to be selected for strict, authoritarian values and the facilitating of their own culture by a common descent could result in an ascendant cultural force which might just undo the gains already made by proponents allied with Cancel Culture. As a matter of capitalist synthesis, then, it follows that there is an incentive to institutions to develop a formal mechanism of social exclusion and to give it precedence over mobs, depriving them of their power and fuel.

I think what is likely to happen with respect to Cancel Culture is three things. First, the energies of Cancel Culture will be captured in a few roles by several institutions who will take on the responsibility of adjudicating cultural conflicts. While such roles at first might seem progressive and radical, in the long run they will be conservative as individuals in that role moderate themselves to the values of a changing society. As such individuals compete between each other for greater prestige, they will develop sophisticated means for managing instances of cultural conflict which will satisfy a wider proportion of society across cultural lines. Second, Cancel Culture will continue unabated for several more years, resulting in several highly visible cases where influential proponents will become targeted for criticism and approbation. The negative consequences they experience for their enthusiastic participation – which, being unregulated, are therefore likely to be arbitrary and disproportionate – will make people reluctant to voice support as it will become seen as a red flag for a belligerent personality worth avoiding. The third will be that, while initially topics such as race and intelligence remain taboo for research, increasing pressure from dominant national forces such as China will force the hand of military to normalize a path for controversial research in the West. This path will be highly respected and used to gradually make people used to a world where the predictive value of intelligence tests and genes are respected and appreciated. People will become more comfortable with the idea of using genetic engineering to close visible achievement gaps, and the uncertainty we feel today will be forgotten.